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Editor's Brief 
This issue of The Colonial Lawyer: Journal 0/ Virginia Law and Public Policy 
is my second and last as Senior Editor. I leave the journal and its future in the 
capable hands of Felicia Silber and her incoming editors and staff. 
Public perception of the legal profession has always been ambivalent. 
Everyone needs attorneys, yet everyone loves to criticize them. They are 
accused of being dishonest, or of manipulating the system for the benefit of the 
wealthy and empowered. This issue of the Lawyer contains two articles which 
relate to these perceptions. 
The first, by Mr. Gerbasi, discusses the use of RIC,O to seize attorney's fees 
prepaid by criminal defendants. The Federal Government seizes the fees under 
the broad forfeiture provisions in RICO by alleging that they are the proceeds of 
illegal activity and therefore can be forfeited just like a mansion or a Lear jet. 
The purchase of legal services is not, of course, comparable to the purchase of 
real estate or a consumer durable. The seizure ignores the potential violation of 
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and Mr. Gerbasi discusses the 
inherent tension in relation to crime families accused of involvement in drug 
traffic. 
Little public sympathy is lost on those accused of being drug traffickers, and 
even less is expended on their attorneys. The public seems to feel that the 
attorneys who act to protect those accused of reprehensible acts are as 
repugnant as the perpetrators of those acts. 
Mr. Raby's article discusses an attempt to regulate the profession of law to 
protect the public and raise the perceived quality of the industry. Virginia's 
new attorney-sanction provision, Virginia Code § 8.01-27l.1, acts in much the 
same way as the existing Federal Rule 11 sanctions. Mr. Raby describes how the 
new code section works and discusses how it might affect the practice of law in 
Virginia. 
Ms. Lewis comments on a case recently argued before the Supreme Court, 
Kendrick v. Bowen. Ms. Lewis discusses the history and policy of the Adolescent 
Family Life Act which is the basis of the suit, and suggests how the Supreme 
Court should address the issues raised. The issues raised are those at the core 
of modern political discussion: government policy toward abortion, the separation 
of church and state, government funding of medical services. 
I hope you enjoy the spring issue, and welcome any comments or thoughts 
you may have. 
Bruce William McDougal 
Senior Editor 
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TOWARD A SUNNIER DAY FOR RICO: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
IMPLICATIONS OF FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES PAID BY 
A CRIME FAMILY DEFENDANT 
. by 
Joseph S. Gerbasi 
The late 1960's and early 1970's signalled the beginning of a sustained effort 
by the United States Govemment to eliminate organized crime. The executive 
branch established the Department of Justice Organized Crime and Racketeering 
Section, along with Department Strike Forces located in major cities, to address 
what was perceived as a pressing national concern. The legislative branch passed 
.. 
a series of laws intended to choke off organized crime, including the 1968 
Consumer Credit Protection Act" the 1968 Gun Control Act,2 and the 1968 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.3 The legislative effort culminated 
in 1970 when Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act4 and the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.5 The two landmark 
statutes enabled by this legislation are the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act6 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute 7 (hereinafter 
referred to as RICO and CCE). 
RICO is useful in attacking highly-sophisticated, organized, and diversified 
criminal activity. The statute prohibits: using income derived from a "pattern of 
racketeering activity" to acquire an interest in, establish, or operate any 
1 18 U.S.C. § 891-94 (1968) (contains provisions relating to extortionate 
credit transactions, i.e., loan-sharking). 
2 18 U.S.c. § 921-929, 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1968). 
3 42 U.S.C § 3711-12 (1984) (providing in part for court-authorized 
interception of wire and oral communication, and protection of federal witnesses). 
4 The Act contains the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) (banning interference 
with commerce by threats or violence), measures banning interstate and foreign 
travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises (18 U.S.C § 1952), and 
the creation of special investigating grand juries (18 U.S.c. § 3331-34), in addition 
to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (I8 U.S.C. § 1961-68). 
5 21 U.S.C. § 800 (1970). 
6 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (1970), enabled by the Organized Crime Control Act. 
7 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970), enabled by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act. 
1 
"enterprise" engaged in, or whose activities affect, interstate commerce;8 acquiring 
an interest in an enterprise engaged in, or whose activities affect, interstate 
commerce through a "pattern of racketeering activity";9 conducting, or 
participating in the conduct of, the affairs of an enterprise engaged in, or whose 
activities affect, interstate commerce through a "pattern of racketeering 
activity"; 10 or conspiring to violate any of these provisions. ll 
In addition to creating an innovative framework for prosecution, Congress 
created strict penal provisions for RICO. The provisions allow for forfeiture to 
the government, upon conviction for a RICO offense, of any interest or asset 
gained by the defendant through unlawful activity. These forfeiture provisions, 
which have identical counterparts in CCE,12 supply much of the prosecutorial 
firepower found in RICO. Both the original RICO and CCE provisions were 
amended in 1984 by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act. The RICO provisions state 
that one found in violation of § 1962 shall forfeit to the United States: 
[A]ny interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 
1962; ... any interest in ... any enterprise which the person has ... participated in the 
conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and any property constituting, or 
derived from, any proceeds which the person obtainedj directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity .. .in violation of section 1962.1 
Property subject to forfeiture includes real property and tangible and 
intangible personal property.I 4 The provisions state that all rights to forfeitable 
property vest in the United States at the time of commission of the alleged crime 
giving rise to forfeiture. Property transferred to a third party after this time is 
forfeitable unless the transferee can establish (I) that he held title to the 
particular property over the defendant at the time defendant allegedly committed 
the RICO violations l5 or (2) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of the 
8 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1970) (an example of this violation is the laundering 
of "dirty" money through a legitimate business). 
9 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1970) (an example of this violation is the use of 
extortion, fraud, murder, etc., to take control over a legitimate business). 
10 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1970) (an example of this violation is the operation 
of a legitimate business through unlawful means such as bribery, theats, etc.). 
II 18 U.S.C § 1962(d) (I970). 
12 21 U.S.C. § 848, 853 (1984). 
13 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1984). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (I9lS4). 
15 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(A) (1984). 
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property, who at the time of transfer was reasonably without cause to believe the 
property was subject to forfeiture.I 6 The forfeiture provisions can apply post-
conviction, to assets previously transferred by the defendant to a third party, and 
pretrial, by the issuance of a restraining order freezing defendant's assets pending 
outcome of the trial. 17 
In light of organized crime's heavy reliance on legal talen t,l8 a critical issue 
is the application of the RICO forfeiture provisions to the attorneys' fees paid by 
a defendant who is a member of an organized crime syndicate, or crime family. 
This article will examine whether applying the RICO forfeiture provisions pretrial 
to property or funds a crime family defendant intends to transfer to an attorney 
as legal fees or post-conviction to property or funds he has transferred to an 
attorney as legal fees deprives that defendant of the right to counsel guaranteed 
by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. The article will 
analyze the RICO forfeiture provisions, which are applied to the widest variety of 
organized crime cases, but will raise both RICO and CCE cases because the 
forfeiture ,provisions in each are identical. 
Because each presents the identical issue in sixth amendment terms, post-
conviction forfeiture and pretrial restraining orders are treated interchangeably. 
The article concludes that this application does not violate the right to counsel 
due to both the unique relationship between the crime family defendant and his 
attorney and the availability of appointed, counsel. I propose a revision to the 
traditional method of appointing counsel in such cases in order to safeguard both 
the right of the crime family defendant to the assistance of counsel and the 
interest of the government in gaining forfeiture of illicit profits to the full 
extent consistent with the purposes underlying forfeiture. 
My proposal is limited to crime family defendants (what most think of as 
"the Mafia") and their attorneys. Crime family defendants may be identified by 
pretrial judicial determination pursuant to an adversarial hearing. The government 
can present evidence of the defendant's involvement in unlawful crime family 
activity, with the defendant having the opportunity to present evidence in 
rebuttal. Virtually all crime families in major cities are well-known to law 
enforcement and judicial officials. If the indictment in a case alleges that the 
defendant is part of a larger group engaging in illegal activities, as with a RICO 
conspiracy charge, or if investigations reveal that he has no legitimate sources of 
income, this may create an inference that he is a crime family member if 
additional corroborating facts so indicate. . Cases and commentators have 
16 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(B) (1984). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(I) (1984). 
18 See infra note 44. 
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frequently addressed the constitutionality of forfeiture of attorneys' fees of a 
RICO or CCE defendant generally, but have never focused solely on a crime 
family defendant. Indeed, defendant's status as a crime family "member" 
contributes significantly to the finding that forfeiture of attorneys' fees does not 
infringe on his right to counsel. 
BACKGROUND 
RICO 
The critical terms of RICO have been broadly defined. "Racketeering 
activity" is defined to mean any of the eight state crimes l9 or twenty-four 
federal crimes20 serving as predicate RICO offenses, and is established by proving 
the necessary elements of the relevant crimes. "Enterprise" is defined to mean 
essentially any individual or association of individuals,21 and is established by 
evidence of an ongoing organization whose associates function as a continuing 
unit.22 "Pattern of racketeering activity" is defined to mean a series of two or 
more predicate criminal acts committed within ten years of one another, at least 
one of which was committed after October 15, 1970. It is established by evidence 
of two or more of the relevant crimes committed by members of the enterprise 
within the-requisite time frame.23 
Purposes oj RICO 
The purposes of RICO are to "provide new weapons of unprecedented scope 
for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots."24 The Statement of 
Findings prefacing the Organized Crime Control Act states that in prior studies 
and investigations, Congress had found organized crime in the United States to be 
a highly-sophisticated, multi-faceted activity that annually drains billions of 
dollars from the economy through unlawful conduct and social exploitation.25 
Congress also reported that organized crime activities weaken the U.S. economic 
system by cutting competition, burden commerce, threaten domestic security, and 
19 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(a) (1970) .. 
20 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(b) (1970). 
21 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1970). 
22 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). 
23 Id. 
24 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983). 
25 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, PUb. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 
923 (1970) (noted in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1981». 
4 
undermine the general welfare of all citizens.26 Congress found that organized 
crime continues to grow due to the limited scope and impact of traditional 
sanctions and remedies available to the government.27 
In light of such findings, Congress declared its purpose' "to seek the 
eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal 
tools"28 used against those engaged in organized crime. It sought to mount "a 
full-scale attack on organized crime."29 "What is needed ... are new approaches 
that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through 
which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-
being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of 
economic power itself ... "30 RICO is a comprehensive statute, intended to give the 
federal government powerful tools with which to pursue the rampant problem of 
organized crime. The vague terms of the statute, together with their broad 
judicial interpretations, allow federal prosecutors wide range in bringing actions 
against a gamut of organized crime activity. Unlike CCE, which is primarily 
limited to individuals who manage or organize narcotics-producing or distributing 
enterprises, RICO is a versatile weapon in the federal prosecutorial arsenal. 
Purposes of RICO Forfeiture 
The unique feature of the forfeiture provisions is their in personam 
operation. Traditionally, all forfeiture provisions in the U.S. were civil in nature 
and operated in rem, against the property of defendant. The property was viewed 
as the offending party. Under RICO, the defendant is viewed as the offending 
party and forfeiture of the property is triggered only by his conviction. In 
personam provisions were unprecedented in the U.S. until RICO, even though they, 
were known to the common law of England and the colonies.31 
Congress' utilization of a revolutionary approach evidences the special 
legislative intent supporting the RICO forfeiture provisions. If the intent behind 
RICO is to eradicate organized crime, then the forfeiture provisions are intended 
to achieve this result by enabling the government to erode the economic base of 
organized crime. "[T]he forfeiture provision was intended to serve all the aims of 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 116 CONGo REC. 602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough). 
30 Id. at 35193 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff). 
31 Note, Criminal RICO Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: "Rough" 
Justice Is Not Enough, 14 HASTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 451, 457 (1987). 
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the RICO statute .. ."32 and represents an effort to " develop law 
enforcementmeasures at least as efficient as those of organized crime."33 During 
the Senate debates prior to the enactment of RICO, one supporter announced: 
While prosecutions and convictions of leaders of organized crime and their 
confederates are increasing each year .. .it is becoming increasingly apparent 
that such convictions alone, which simply remove the leaders from control of 
the syndicate-owned enterprises but do not attack the vested property 
interests whose control passes on to other Cosa Nostra leaders, are not 
adequate to demolish the structure of the surviving organizations which they 
run.34 
Prior to the 1984 amendment of the RICO forfeiture provisions, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee remarked that the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act was 
"designed to enhance the use of...criminal forfeiture, as a law enforcement tool in 
combatting two of the most serious crime problems facing the country: 
racketeering and drug trafficking .. .it is through economic power that 
[racketeering] is sustained and grows."35 The Committee went on to comment 
that conviction of individual racketeers under RICO would be meaningless if "the 
economic power bases of criminal organization or enterprises were left intact."36 
The forfeiture provisions were promulgated in order to effectuate RICO's purpose 
by stripping crime families of their economic power}7 An earlier Senate Report 
echoes this goal by indicating that the RICO remedies seek to divest crime family 
kingpins of their economic sources of power in order to choke off the family and 
free the channels of commerce from racketeering influence.38 The Supreme Court 
has joined this consensus by stating that the goal of RICO forfeiture is to remove 
the profit from organized crime by separating the crime family kingpin from his 
32 116 CONGo REC. 18955 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan). 
33 Id. at 35199 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). 
34 Id. at 607 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Byrd). 
35 S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Con g., 1st Sess. 191-192, reprinted in 1984 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374. 
36 Id. 
37 In the early 1930's, violence between gangs of Sicilian and Neapolitan 
immigrants caused gang leaders to devise a plan of organization for crime in the 
U.S. The existing gangs became recognized as families, each with its own 
hierarchy of leadership and territorial limits. 116 CONGo REC. 598 (1970) (citing 
cover story of Time of August 22, 1969). 
38 S. REP. NO. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969). 
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unlawful gains.39 By taking the profit out of organized crime, the forfeiture 
provisions would also act as a "mighty deterrent to any further expansion of 
organized crime's economic power."40 In the face of the relative impotence of 
the traditional sanctions of fine and imprisonment, forfeiture diversifies and 
strengthens federal prosecutorial weapons designed to fight organized crime by 
enabling the government to strip the crime family of the fruits of unlawful 
activities. Courts believe that forfeiture is the only effective penalty against the 
crime family defendant, holding that if the defendant is fined or incarcerated but 
his "family" is left with the economic vestiges of his unlawful acts, the defendant 
could manage the organization by proxy from prison, or successors could Quickly 
climb the hierarchical ladder within the family and cQntinue illegal activities.41 
DISCUSSION 
Scope of RICO Forfeiture and the Sixth Amendment 
Judicial interpretation of the breadth of the RICO forfeiture provisions 
determines the scope of their effectiveness in destroying the economic base 
supporting crime families. The demand for high-quality legal services by crime 
families is intensely high. Many attribute the longevity and prosperity of crime 
families to their ability to command high-quality legal talent42 and to the ability 
of their attorneys to repeatedly win sanctions of fines and short prison sentences. 
These sanctions are ineffective against organized crime because of the seemingly 
endless supply of cash and new managerial talent within crime families.43 
Attorneys are the "lifeblood" of organized crime and have become a "critical 
39 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983). 
40 116 CONGo REC. 607 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Byrd). 
41 See United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979). 
42 See In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin and Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th 
Cir. 1988). 
43 " .. .in the past five years the 25 major identified traditional organized 
crime groups in the country have had 75 separate changes in leadership-28 
resulting from prosecutions. Yet, to our knowledge not a single one of these 
groups has broken up as a result of the change in leadership." Forfeiture of 
Narcotics Proceeds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1980) (statement of Irving 
B. Nathan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department 
of Justice). See also Dombrink and Meeker, Racketeering Prosecution: The Use 
and Abuse of RICO, 16 Rutgers L.J. 633, 635-636 (1985). 
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element in the life support system of organized crime."44 "It is clear 
thattraditional organized crime ... depend[s] upon, and could not effectively operate 
without, these attorneys."45 
The plain language of §l963 calls for forfeiture of any interest the 
defendant gained in violation of the substantive section of RICO.46 Legislative 
history gives an equally broad interpretation of forfeitable interests. The Senate 
Judiciary Committee wrote that the language of the forfeiture provisions "is 
designed to accomplish a forfeiture of any interest of any type in the [unlawful] 
enterprise ... "47 The Supreme Court has held that forfeiture applies to any 
interest traceable to racketeering activity, including cash profits as well as 
ownership interests in an enterprise.48 The Court reasoned that a broad reading 
of "interest" is consistent with the pattern of RICO in using broad terms and 
concePts,49 and that Congress would have expressly limited forfeitable interests in 
the statute if it had so intended. 50 A broad interpretation allows the government 
to defeat transactions where a defendant transfers assets or income gained 
through racketeering activity to a third party for concealment in order to avoid 
forfeiture. This interpretation best achieves the purposes of the forfeiture 
provisions to erode the economic power of organized crime by mandating 
forfeiture of any form such power could take. 
"Any interest" is a concept broad enough to include assets or funds gained 
through illegal activity and paid as attorneys' fees. However, many courts and 
commentators claim that requiring post-conviction forfeiture of attorneys' fees or 
allowing the issuance of a pretrial restraining order freezing a defendant's assets 
infringes on the sixth amendment right to counsel.51 
44 Lawyers Called Organized Crime "Li/e Support", 193 N.Y.L.J. 1 (March II, 
1985) (quoting 1985 staff report of the President's Commission on Organized Crime). 
45 [d. (referring to the small group of lawyers deeply involved in 
representing crime family defendants). 
46 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(I) (1970). 
47 S. REP. NO. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 79 (1969). 
48 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983). 
49 [d. at 21, 27 (citing a portion of legislative history which states: "The 
provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial 
purposes." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947 
(1970». 
50 [d. at 23. 
51 United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 
194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), a/I'd on other grounds, 794 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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The Deterrence Theory 
The federal courts are split on the sixth amendment propriety of applying 
the RICO forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court has 
notdecided the issue. None of the cases establishes a general rule concerning a 
crime family defendant. 
The law is clear on a single point. Property or funds transferred or 
contracted to be transferred to an attorney as part of a sham or fraudulent 
transaction, where the transfer is fraudulently disguised as a fee payment and the 
attorney is being used as a haven for concealing forfeitable property, must be 
forfeitable in order to prevent the dissipation of unlawfully-acquired assets.52 
This interpretation preserves the forfeiture goal of stripping the racketeer of his 
illicit economic gains. The split in the case law develops concerning the 
forfeitability of legitimately-paid attorneys fees. 
As a first step, the nature of the sixth amendment must be briefly examined. 
The amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."53 Implicit in this basic 
guarantee is the right of a non-indigent to retain counsel of choice,54 out of 
one's private resources and free of governmental interference.55 However, the 
right to counsel of choice is qualified - it must give way when required by the 
fair administration of justice 56 and· by the purposes of the criminal forfeiture 
statutes.57 Unlike the basic right to the assistance of counsel, the right is not 
absolute and " ... cannot be used merely as a manipulative monkey wrench."58 
One line of authority has held that the forfeiture of bona fide attorneys' 
fees under RICO violates the sixth amendment because the threat of fee forfeiture 
will deter attorneys from defending RICO cases. Allegedly, an attorney will be· 
reluctant to take on a case if he knows that his fee will be forfeited if his client 
is convicted. Some courts have engaged in bootstrapping, holding that because of 
the deterrent potential and subsequent chill on sixth amendment rights, Congress 
52 United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 
(D. Md. 1986). 
53 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
54 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). 
55 United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905,923 (4th Cir. 1987). 
56 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 250 (2d Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986). 
57 United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541, 1558 (D. Utah 1987), rev'd on 
other grounds, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988). 
58 Gandy v. State of Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978). 
9 
never intended the forfeiture provisions to apply to bona fide attorneys' fees.59 
Other courts have found that Congress clearly intended forfeiture to apply to 
attorneys' fees, but that such application violates the sixth amendment due to the 
deterrent factor.60 
In United States v. Badalamenti, 61 the district court held that Congress 
never intended forfeiture to encompass attorneys' fees. However, the court 
considered the attorney rendering bona fide legal services to be on notice that 
property or funds received as fees derived from unlawful activity and were 
subject to· forfeiture.62 Therefore, according to § 1963(m)(6)(B), the bona fide 
purchaser exception, the court would find attorneys' fees to be within the scope 
of forfeiture. In United States v. Rogers, the district court concluded similarly, 
yet conceded that the forfeiture provisions are clear in stating that all proceeds 
of racketeering activity traceable to that activity are potentially forfeitable. The 
court added that - fees paid to an attorney become the property of the attorney 
and cease to be the property of defendant.63 Because forfeiture can operate only 
against the property of defendant, the court reasoned that attorneys fees must 
no·t be subject to forfeiture. However, this logic ignores the central reason for 
the forfeiture provisions, which is to prevent a defendant from avoiding forfeiture 
by transferring property to his attorney in a sham fee payment. The court found 
that Congress intended forfeiture to apply exclusively to sham attorney fee 
payments. The court relied on a portion of the report of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee issued prior to the 1984 amendment of the forfeiture provisions: "The 
provision should be construed to deny relief [only] to third parties acting as 
nominees of the defendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent 
transactions;n64 
But the Rogers court unilaterally inserted the bracketed word of limitation, 
when the passage as a whole gives no indication that attorneys' fees should be 
59 United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), a/I'd 
on other grounds, 794 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. 
Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985). 
60 United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905,926 (4th Cir. 1987). 
61 United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), a/I'd on 
other grounds, 794 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1986). 
62 [d. at 196. 
63 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1346. 
64 -S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Con g., 2d Sess. 209 n.47 (1984). 
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forfeitable only when paid in the course of fraud.65 Additionally, the Rogers 
court noted that § 1963 does not expressly provide for the forfeiture of assets 
legitimately transferred to attorneys, arguing that this interpretation does not 
exempt from forfeiture assets transferred to an attorney as part of a sham. But 
if the court is going to indulge this type of logic, it could just as easily conclude 
that all attorneys' fees should be subject to forfeiture, because § 1963 makes no 
express mention of attorneys' fees at all. 
In United States v. Bassett, 66 the district court held that the sixth 
amendment prevented the CCE forfeiture provisions from applying to bona fide 
attorneys' fees. However, this case is factually unique. CCE applies chiefly to 
drug-trafficking and does not encompass the wide variety of organized crime 
activities contemplated by RICO. Failing to apply forfeiture to legitimate 
attorneys' fees paid by a CCE defendant does not undermine the policy 
considerations present in RICO regarding the elimination of all of organized 
crime. Hence, it is more plausible to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture in a 
CCE case. The court did not find deterrence as the reason for the sixth 
amendment violation but found it in the fact that if the attorneys withdrew from 
the case, the defendants would be without counsel less than two months before 
trial. Even if new defense counsel could be secured on such short notice for a 
complex case, there would be insufficient time to prepare. 
That Congress never intended the RICO forfeiture provisions to apply to 
attorneys' fees can also be rebutted by reference to the line of cases holding that 
Congress did in fact intend such an application but that it conflicts with the 
sixth amendment due to the deterrence theory.67 The courts in Harvey and 
Nichols found that the plain language of §1963, which fails to mention attorneys' 
fees in any context, combined with the lack of contrary legislative intent, 
indicates that Congress intended such payments to be subject to the same 
conditions for exemption provided for all forfeitable property by § 1963(m)(6)(A) 
and (B).68 Legislative history indicates that the concept of forfeitable property 
in § 1963 is to be broadly construed.69 Because Congress clearly intended 
attorneys' fee payments to be within the concept of forfeiture, only the sixth 
amendment question remains unresolved. 
65 See Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE 
Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493,501 (1986) (emphasis added). 
66 United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986). 
67 See supra note 59. 
68 Harvey, 814 F.2d at 913; Nichols, 841 F.2d at __ . 
69 S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1984). 
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The courts holding that fee forfeiture violates the sixth amendment rely on 
the deterrence argument. In support of this, the Rogers court cited a statement 
of the House Judiciary Committee prior to the 1984 amendments to the forfeiture 
provisions: "[N]othing in this section .. .is intended to interfere with a person's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel."70 However, the next sentence of the report 
states: "[T]he Committee ... does not resolve the conflict in District Court opinions 
on ... a person's right to retain counseL" 71 This statement demonstrates that 
Congress did not intend to resolve the sixth amendment question, but intended to 
lea ve it to the courts. 
The Harvey court found a sixth amendment violation by reasoning that fee 
forfeiture impedes a defendant's ability to pay an attorney and chills his access 
to private counsel, thereby violating the right to counsel of choice. The court 
explicitly found no violation of defendant's "basic" sixth amendment right not to 
be denied counsel.72 The court misplaced its focus and failed to properly 
recognize the qualified nature of the right to counsel of choice. The court 
asserts that the right to be represented by private counsel is the "primary" 
component. of the sixth amendment. However, other courts have explicitly 
announced that the right to counsel of choice may be permissibly infringed when 
required by the fair administration of justice and by the purposes underlying 
criminal forfeiture.73 In the crime family context, the purposes underlying the 
RICO forfeiture provisions strongly justify denying the right of a crime family 
defendant to retain counsel of choice. In enacting RICO, Congress sought to 
address what two decades of investigations indicated was a major national problem 
requiring immediate legislative action. Congress recognized the need for a method 
of eroding the economic infrastructure supporting crime family growth. Forfeiture 
. is the only effective way to divest the crime family of its economic power 
because it forces the family to disgorge illicit profits. Finding that bona fide 
attorneys' fees are subject to forfeiture is needed to fulfill the purpose of RICO 
of obliterating organized crime. This strongly justifies any incidental chilling 
effect on the ability of a crime family defendant to hire private counse1.74 A 
permissible sixth amendment infringement occurs, not an unconstitutional 
deprivation of the basic right not to be denied counsel. 
70 H.R. REP. NO. 845, 98th Con g., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 19 n.l (1984). 
71 [d. 
72 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
73 See supra notes 55 and 56. 
74 See United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74,80-81 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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A violation of the right to counsel of choice, when warranted by one of 
these overriding considerations, is not unconstitutional. Indeed, the statement of 
the House Judiciary Committee cited by the Rogers court, together with the 
subsequent sentence, shows that Congress intended forfeiture to honor only the 
basic right to counsel. The effects on the right to counsel of choice were to be 
resolved by the courts. By its logic, the Harvey court would imply that appointed 
counsel is inadequate to satisfy the sixth amendment. Courts have consistently 
rejected this idea.75 
The district court in Nichols stated that fulfilling the goals of the 
racketeering statutes does not justify limiting defendant's admittedly Qualified 
right to counsel of choice because legitimate payment of attorneys' fees does not 
contribute to criminal activity. This is untrue in the crime family context 
because it is the perpetual generation of cash that allows crime families to 
prosper and to diversify their criminal operations.76 The court also held that it 
would not undermine the racketeering laws' purpose to exempt from forfeiture 
funds or property reasonably necessary for defendant to pay attorneys' fees, even 
if defendant were found guilty on the racketeering charge and had used profits 
from the unlawful activity to pay his lawyer. However, if the government seeks 
to punish a defendant for a crime which produced "tainted" profits, it should not 
be willing to let him use them to hire a lawyer. This is identical to allowing him 
to keep the fruits of his racketeering activity.77 The Jones court suggested that 
the fact that the attorney gives bona fide legal services should overcome any 
notion of fee forfeiture.1 8 But the legitimacy of the services rendered is no 
reason 'to allow a crime family defendant to use the attorney as a conduit for 
hiding forfeitable assets. This conclusion exempts a transfer based solely on 
legitimacy of services rendered rather than on the transferee's knowledge of the 
forfeitability of the assets transferred. This creates an exception to forfeiture 
outside of the Bona Fide Purchaser (BFP) exception contained in the provisions 
themselves. It also encourages the proliferation of an intimate attorney-crime 
75 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45 (1932); In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin and Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 
(4th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan.2, 1985, 605 F. 
Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985). 
76 Friedman, et. aI., Fighting Organized Crime: Special Re!ponses to a 
Special Problem, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 439, 455-56 (1985). 
77 See United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979) (equating the transfer of economic power to attorneys 
with the retention of economic power by the crime family). 
78 United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1988) 
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family relationship already typifying many crime families.79 This directly 
undermines the goal of stripping illegally-gained economic power from crime 
families. 
The principal reason why deterrence cannot support finding a sixth 
amendment violation when attorneys' 'fees paid by a crime family defendant are 
subject to RICO forfeiture is revealed by the unique relationship existing, in 
reality, between members of a crime family and their attorneys. Any reasons why 
an attorney may be deterred by the prospect of losing his fees from representing 
an ordinary RICO defendant do not exist in the crime family context. There is a 
remarkable trend for crime families to depend on a very small number of lawyers 
for all of their legal advice and representation. In 1985, the staff report of the 
President's Commission on Organized Crime found that "a small group of lawyers" 
have become critically important to the survival of crime families.80 The chief 
reason for this is because crime families are understandably secretive, and 
distrustful of "outsiders." They are reluctant to open their doors to those whom 
they do not know. The result is that this small number of lawyers comprises 
people who devote much, if not all, of their· time to advising and representing 
crime families. They perform roles similar to those of house counsel in major 
corporations, and are rarely paid on a per-case fee basis. Compensation tends to 
be in the form of large annual retainers. Rarely, then, will a "crime family 
attorney" be deterred from representing a client in a RICO case simply by the 
prospect of losing what would ordinarily be viewed as a fee payment. Any 
payment he receives during the course of a particular case is likely no more than 
a bonus coming outside of his normal retainer-style compensation. 
There is a line of authority offering several compelling reasons why applying 
the RICO forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees, either post-conviction or 
pretrial. presents no sixth amendment problem. The cases uniformly indicate that 
nothing in either the language or legislative history of § 1963 calls for an 
exemption of attorneys fees of any type. They emphasize that the canons of 
professional responsibility require an attorney to represent a criminal defendant 
zealously despite the risk of not receiving compensation.81 thereby minimizing the 
possibility of deterrence. Additionally. courts have held that attorneys' fees 
forfeited to the government may be distributed back to an attorney. in the 
79 See supra note 44. 
80 [d. 
81 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2. 1985. 605 F. 
Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds. 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(c)(I) and DR 
7-10 I(A)(2)( 1980». 
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amount of a reasonable fee, upon petition to the court.82 The existence of this 
avenue of relief forecloses all reasonable possibility that attorneys will be 
deterred from representing crime family defendants facing RICO charges. 
In addition, crime families frequently use attorneys as conduits through 
which to launder money or as harbors for the safekeeping of illegally-obtained 
funds or property.83 These sham transfers are disguised as attorneys' fee 
payments, and courts have emphasized that an important goal of the forfeiture 
provIsIons is to block such bogus transactions84 and to prevent the dissipation of 
forfeitable assets.85 A rule limiting forfeiture of attorneys' fees to sham 
transactions would require differentiation between a bona fide fee payment and a 
sham payment. This distinction cannot always be accurately made. 
The district court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena added: "In the same manner 
that a defendant cannot obtain a Rolls Royce with the fruits of a crime, he 
cannot ... obtain the services of the Rolls Royce of attorneys from these same 
tainted funds."86 This reflects the argument that a defendant has no sixth 
amendment right to pay an attorney with the proceeds of illicit activity.87 In 
Monsanto the second circuit supported this conclusion by stating that a 
discrimination problem would be created if an otherwise indigent defendant was 
allowed to use large sums of money gained through illegal activity to retain high-
priced counsel, while an indigent defendant who committed a crime producing no 
such spoils was denied this benefit.88 
Sections (m)(6)(A) and (B) create two exceptions to the general rule that 
forfeitable property or funds transferred to a third party after commission of the 
act giving rise to forfeiture are themselves subject to forfeiture. The third party 
may keep the property or funds if he can establish that at the time of 
commission of the allegedly unlawful acts he had title to the property or funds 
superior to that of defendant; or if he can establish that he is a BFP for value of 
82 United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453, 456 (W.O. Pa. 1986). 
83 See supra note 44. 
84 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985, 605 F. 
Supp. at 850 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985). 
85 In re Forfeiture Hearing a~ to Caplin and Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 643 
(4th Cir. 1988). 
86 See supra note 81. 
87 Caplin and Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 646 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Brickey, 
"The sixth amendment guarantees only the right to use legitimate assets to obtain 
the assistance of counsel. If the defendant has no assets, the sixth amendment 
requires the appointment of counseL" 72 VA. L. REV. 493, 553 (1986». 
88 Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 85 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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the property or funds who at the time of transfer was reasonably without cause 
to believe the property or funds were subject to forfeiture. "Purchasers" applies 
to providers of legal services as well as to other transferees for value.89 
These are the sole exceptions to forfeiture contained in the provisions. The 
attorney will never be able to satisfy the "superior title" exception simply because 
he would have to show that he had title over defendant in the funds or property 
which defendant gained through allegedly unlawful activity. The only party with 
superior title to defendant at the relevant point in time will be the victim of the 
allegedly unlawful activity, not defendant's attorney. Similarly, the attorney will 
never be able to meet the BFP exception due to the nature of his relationship 
with the crime family client. Courts have held that the indictment alone puts the 
attorney on notice of the forfeitability of defendant's assets90 and have viewed 
the attorney rendering bona fide legal services as being in position to be on 
notice of the forfeitability of property or funds.91 The attorney representing a 
crime family defendant will be on perpetual "constructive notice" of the 
forfeitability of his client's assets and the funds out of which his fee was paid 
due, to the dynamics of the relationship between a crime family and the attorneys 
it employs. Most attorneys representing crime families do so on an ongoing and 
comprehensive basis and possess ·an intimate knowledge of the family'S internal 
affairs.92 It is difficult to comprehend a crime family RICO case where defense 
counsel is without notice that his client's assets have derived from unlawful 
activity and are subject to forfeiture.93 
Because he me~ts neither exception, an attorney rendering bona fide legal 
services to a crime family defendant will always be subject to fee forfeiture, 
according to the terms of the statute. This means that finding a transfer of 
property or funds as legitimate attorneys' fees to be exempt from forfeiture, 
given that deterrence of representation is too tenuous a sixth amendment claim in 
the crime family context, is to create a new exception entirely unwarranted by 
the text of RICO. It creates a loophole for an attorney to avoid forfeiture which 
he otherwise would never be able to avoid. It also directly controverts the 
89 See United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 915 (4th Cir. 1987). 
90 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 605 F. Supp. at 849-50, rev'd on other 
grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) (following United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 
476,471 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984». 
91 See supra note 60. 
92 See supra note 44. 
93 See generally United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. at 1556 n.21; United 
States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196. 
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legislative intent behind forfeiture by creating a situation where a crime family is 
able to avoid being stripped of the economic power gained through racketeering 
activity. 
Appointment of Counsel 
Despite the weakness of the claim that fee forfeiture violates the right to 
counsel by deterring attorneys from defending crime family clients facing RICO 
charges, a solution is available to guarantee defendant's sixth amendment rights in 
case any potential for deterrence exists. He could simply retain an attorney with 
funds not gained through illicit activity and therefore not subject to forfeiture. 
If no untainted funds are available, the appointment of counsel will safeguard 
defendant's sixth amendment rights. 
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides that counsel shall be appointed by 
the court to a defendant who is "financially unable to obtain counsel" after the 
court has advised defendant that he has a right to be represented by counsel and 
that counsel may be appointed if he cannot afford it.94 Appointed counsel may 
be furnished by private firms, bar associations, legal aid agencies, or defender 
associations.95 The purpose of appointed counsel is to fulfill the sixth amendment 
rights of those financially unable to do so through private counsel.96 The 
Criminal Justice Act must not be used to prevent defendants able to afford 
counsel from exercising that privilege.97 
Courts have unanimously upheld appointed counsel as sufficient to satisfy the 
sixth amendment.98 The Supreme Court in Powell held, on right to counsel and 
due process grounds, that a defendant in a capital case' has a right to appointed 
counsel. The necessary implication is that appointed counsel satisfies the sixth 
amendment. The Court in Gideon held that the right to appointed counsel applies 
to any defendant charged with a felony; the implication is the same. In United 
States v. Bello,99 the court found that appointment of counsel fulfills the right to 
counsel. Clearly, appointed and retained counsel are equivalent in sixth 
amendment terms. 
Courts have consistently held in RICO cases that the appointment of counsel 
fulfills defendant's sixth amendment rights when fee forfeiture renders him unable 
94 18 U.S.c. § 3006A(b) (1982). 
95 18 U.S.C § 3006A(a) (1982). 
96 See United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. at 1558-59. 
97 [d. 
98 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932). 
99 United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979). 
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to retain private counsel, either due to a pretrial freeze on assets lOO or a post-
conviction forfeiture order allegedly deterring future representation. lOI The 
Caplin and Drysdale court held that the sixth amendment guarantees simply the 
basic right to representation, which is to be represented by either retained or 
appointed counsel. Forfeiture therefore cannot threaten sixth amendment rights 
when appointed counsel is available. l02 In Nichols, the tenth circuit found no 
violation of the right to counsel in a similar situation when appointed counsel is 
available. l03 The fourth circuit raised an additional argument in Harvey by 
claiming that appointed counsel is no answer to the sixth amendment problem 
created by fee forfeiture because the "available force of public defenders .. .is 
insufficient to provide [sixth amendment] assurance."104 However, the number of 
public defenders available to serve as appointed counsel is not so grave a problem 
as to create constitutional concerns. Neither are public defenders the sole source 
of appointed counseLl 05 The argument concerning the quality of appointed 
counsel was rejected by the fourth circuit in Caplin and Dry~dale and by the 
implicit holdings of Powell and Gideon. The Caplin and Drysdale court rejected 
the notion of appointed counsel being presumptively unqualified for complex 
racketeering cases, claiming that such an idea would lead to "the absurd result 
that the government could not prosecute racketeers with no funds in their 
possession." I 06 
Regardless, the right to counsel assures only the fact of representation and 
the Constitution reflects the "harsh reality that the quality of a defendant's 
representation frequently may turn on his ability to retain the best counsel money 
can buy."107 Even if appointed counsel were of lower quality than retained 
counsel, no constitutional problem would exist. 
The Harvey court argues that the availability of appointed counsel for RICO 
defendants is of little consolation because of the catch-22 created when a 
defendant does not qualify for appointed counsel because he possesses untainted 
100 United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
994 (1985). 
101 United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987). 
102 See supra note 78. 
103 Nichols, 841 F.2d at __ 
104 Harvey, 814 F.2d at 921. 
105 See supra note 95. 
106 /d. (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984». 
107 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. I, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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funds sufficient to hire counsel, yet cannot hire a lawyer because attorneys may 
be deterred from representing a client whose assets are subject to forfeiture. 108 
However, this argument rests on faulty logic. Attorneys will not be deterred 
from representing a client when they know that the client possesses untainted 
assets out of which to pay legal fees. But in crime family cases an attorney may 
not want to take any chance at all of losing his fees. He may be deterred even 
if some of defendant's assets are subject to forfeiture because of his knowledge 
that most assets of a crime family member are likely to be tainted. The catch-22 
then rests on the validity of the deterrence theory, which has been shown not to 
apply in the crime family context due to the nature of the attorney-crime family 
relationship. 
However, even if any potential exists for a crime family defendant to be 
caught in this catch-22, where he is rendered defacto indigent by the forfeiture 
order but is not dejure indigent, a solution exists. Rather than resolve the 
question as the Harvey court did, which was to hold that a sixth amendment 
violation existed and that forfeiture could not apply to attorneys' fee payments, a 
solution exists whereby defendant's sixth amendment rights can be fulfilled while 
still applying forfeiture to the attorneys' fees and thereby eroding the crime 
family'S tainted economic base to the maximum amount. The forfeiture provisions 
should be amended to allow for counsel to be appointed to an alleged crime family 
defendant facing these circumstances. 
The catch-22 is unique to the crime family defendant because it is when 
representing this type of client that the attorney most likely fears losing his fee 
even when the defendant possesses assets not subject to forfeiture. Creating a 
"RICO crime family exception" to the traditional rules for appointing counsel in 
criminal cases according to the Criminal Justice Act specifically avoids any 
potential problem a crime family defendant may face in acquiring counsel, while 
still allowing the government to pursue attorneys' fees under RICO foi-feiture. 
This plan accords full respect to the sixth amendment. It gives the government 
the greatest opportunity to erode the economic foundation of crime families and 
to eradicate organized crime. This is the clear purpose of forfeiture and of RICO 
as a whole. 
Singling out crime family defendants for special treatment is justified. In an 
equal protection context, a crime family member does not qualify as a member of 
a "suspect" class, and a distinction between defendants who are members of crime 
families and those who are not must bear only some rational relationship to a 
legitimate governmental interest. 109 Allowing forfeiture of attorneys' fees paid 
108 See supra note 101. 
109 McDonald v. Board of Election, 349 U.S. 802, 809 (1968). 
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by a crime family defendant serves the legitimate governmental interest in 
eradicating organized crime embodied in RICO by forcing the sacrifice of interests 
'gained through unlawful acts. In addition, this interpretation of the RICO 
forfeiture provisions suffers no other constitutional infirmities. IIO The special 
treatment is not only constitutional, but its purpose is to guarantee constitutional 
rights. RICO represents a concerted effort between the executive and legislative 
branches to destroy organized crime, and Congress envisioned criminal forfeiture 
as the most efficient way to deteriorate the substantial economic bases supporting 
crime family empires. If Congress targets the law towards a particular group, the 
judiciary is justified in applying the law to that group in a unique way. 
Amending the RICO forfeiture provisions to provide for appointed counsel to 
defacto indigent crime family defendants serves both the defendant and the goals 
of RICO. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has shown that in the unique case of the crime family defendant 
facing RICO charges, the government is permitted by both the language and 
legislative history of the statute and by the Constitution to pursue forfeiture of 
attorneys' fee payments in both a pretrial and post-conviction posture. RICO 
affords no special protection from forfeiture to attorneys or to attorneys' fees. 
Due to the unique nature of the relationship between a crime family defendant 
and his attorney, th~ latter will not be deterred from representation by the threat 
of fee forfeiture. The availability of appointed counsel in such cases guarantees 
defendant'S sixth amendment rights. Amending the RICO forfeiture provisions to 
allow for appointed counsel when a crime family defendant is not dejure indigent 
but is rendered defacto indigent by the forfeiture order eliminates any potential 
sixth amendment infringements associated with forfeiture of attorneys' fees. 
Creation of a "RICO crime family exception" serves both the sixth amendment and 
the purposes underlying RICO forfeiture. 
While the government may incur the cost of appointing an attorney in order 
to be able to pursue forfeiture of attorneys' fees, this is not a question of 
110 Post-conviction deprivation of an attorney's property interest in 
legitimately-paid fees presents no procedural due process violation for the 
attorney. The deprivation will not occur unless the government can show at the 
pretrial adversarial hearing that the defendant is a crime family member. This 
affords sufficient procedural due process to the attorney in danger of losing his 
fees. ' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 345 (1975) (holding that procedural due 
process is satisfied when the petitioner has an effective means of communicating 
his case to the decision-maker before the deprivation). Issuance of a pretrial 
restraining order freezing defendant's assets and preventing him from paying an 
attorney presents no procedural due process violation for the attorney for the 
same reasons. 
20 
spending a dollar in order to earn one. By winning forfeiture of attorneys' fees, 
the government obtains the additional advantage of forcing a defendant to forego 
illicit profits, thereby helping to dissolve the foundation of economic strength 
supporting organized crime. 
In Caplin and Drysdale the fourth circuit recognized the need to defer to 
Congressional will concerning the problems RICO seeks to address. I I I The court 
states that a ban on fee forfeiture, in addition to restricting the scope of 
Congress's efforts to solve the organized crime problem, will curtail future 
legislative flexibility to deal with the problem. 1l2 Allowing attorneys to profit 
from unlawfully-obtained funds may make it easier for them to become deeply-
involved with crime families as ongoing advisers, a characteristic already true of 
most attorney-crime family relationships. This also creates the potential for 
increased public cynicism toward the legal system.l 13 
The right to counsel "cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions.'"114 That crime family defendants have as compelling a right to 
counsel as anyone else is not disputed. The plan for court-appointed counsel for 
such defendants in order to preserve the government's interest in pursuing 
forfeiture of attorneys' fees passes muster under the sixth amendment and is 
demanded by the high principles underlying RICO. 
RICO was enacted in order to make progress in what some have called a 
national war against organized crime. One of the many Congressional 
investigations leading to the passage of RICO found: "The Mafia is a secret 
conspiracy against law and order which will ruthlessly eliminate anyone who 
stands in the way of...any criminal enterprise in which it is interested. It will 
destroy anyone ... [i]t will use any means available ... "115 The special national 
problem of organized crime justified the creation of a statute specifically targeted 
towards eliminating that problem. Fulfilling the aims of that statute justifies the 
III Caplin and Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 648. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 649. 
114 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (citing Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 
U.S. 312 (1926». 
liS Senate Special Comm. to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate 
Commerce. Third Interim Report, S. REP. NO. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ISO (1951). 
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special scheme of treatment for the terrorist element of society represented by 
crime families. whose continued existence demonstrates the need for innovative 
application of innovative laws. Forfeiture of attorneys' fees will enhance the 
quality of RICO crime family convictions and will represent a significant 
steptoward dismantling organized crime's carefully-cultivated myth of being 
un touch a ble. 
22 
KENDRICK V. BOWEN AND THE CHASTITY ACT: 
ON THE HIGH WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 
by 
Cheri Lewis 
When Congress passed the Adolescent Family Life Act l (AFLA), the so-
called "Chastity Act,"2 it could hardly have intended to make bedfellows of the 
di verse religious denomina tions tha t ha ve coalesced to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Act under the Establishment Clause. The AFLA, the 
constitutionality of which the Supreme Court will decide this term, was a federal 
grant program designed to address the social ills of adolescent pregnancy and 
premarital relations by allocating funds to various charitable, religious, and 
voluntary organizations to provide counselling and teaching of adolescents. 
Suit was brought in 1983 to challenge the "Chastity Act" by the director of 
the Virginia American Civil Liberties Union after he learned of a program run by 
the Catholic Diocese of Northern Virginia in Arlington3. Since then, the AFLA 
has united such disparate groups as the American Jewish Congress, the National 
Organization of Women, Methodist ministries from Northern Virginia and 
Richmond, Planned Parenthood, and Americans for Religious Freedom in an effort 
to have the Act invalidated. In May of 1987, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia did just that in Kendrick v. Bowen,4 which the Supreme 
Court has taken on direct appeal. 5 
Enacted in 1981, the AFLA was a $30 million-a-year grant program 
authorizing a variety of community organizations to counsel and teach adolescents 
on matters relating to premarital relations and pregnancy. The Act sought "to 
find effective means ... of reaching adolescents before they become sexually active," 
I 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1982). 
2 The original Congressional draft of the AFLA bill spoke in terms of 
discouraging "adolescent promiscuity" and promoting "chastity." S. 1090, 97th 
Con g., 1st Sess. § 1901(a) (Apr. 30, 1981). 
3 'Chastity Act' Lawsuit is Pitting Religions Against One Another, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1988, at I, col. 1. 
4 657 F. SuPP. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-253 (U.S. Jan. 
11,1988). 
5 The Supreme Court has taken this case because an Act of Congress was 
struck down as unconstitutional. Appeal Pending, No. 87-253, (1988). 
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"to promote adoption as an alternative for adolescents" and "to establish 
innovative, comprehensive and integrated approaches to the delivery of care 
services for pregnant adolescents .. ."6 Congress had concluded that "legislation, to 
foster alternatives to abortion, and to encourage adolescents to bring their babies 
to term, serves a critical national interest."7 However, the AFLA contained a 
major stipulation that grant payments would be restricted to organizations that 
did not provide abortions or abortion counselling or referral and that did not 
"advocate, promote, or encourage abortion."S 
In Kendrick v. Bowen, the district court found the AFLA in violation of the 
Establishment Clause of the first amendment9 under the tripartite test of Lemon 
v. Kurtzman,lO the traditional test applied in such !=hallenges. lI Judge Richey's 
opinion held that, while the Act carried a valid secular purpose of addressing 
problems caused by teenage pregnancy and premarital sexual relations, both on its 
face and as applied, the AFLA had the primary effect of advancing religion and 
therefore violated the Establishment Clause.12 Moreover, because many 
organizations receiving benefits from the AFLA have a religious character and 
purpose, and the activities they were involved in were counselling and education, 
often provided in small groups or on a one-on-one basis, Kendrick concluded that 
the degree of government monitoring necessary to prevent grantees from 
advancing religion would create "excessive entanglement" between government and 
religion.13 
In addition to the fact that Kendrick has created a schism among various 
religious organizations, this case is noteworthy because it presents a number of 
ancillary constitutional issues offering alternative grounds for invalidation of the 
AFLA's program scheme. Although it is not likely that the Supreme Court will 
examine these issues, this article will endeavor to review them after an evaluation 
6 42 U.S.C. § 300z(b)(1)-(3). 
7 S. Rep. 97-161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. I (19S1). 
S 42 U.S.C. §300z-10(a). . This section of the Act provided an exception to 
this restriction, stating that "any such program or project may provide referral 
for abortion counseling to a pregnant adolescent if such adolescent and the 
parents or guardians of such adolescent request such referral...." [d. 
9 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." U. S. CONST. amend. I. 
10 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
11 657 F. Supp. at 1556. 
12 [d. at 1564. 
13 [d. at 156S. 
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of the district court's decision of the case under the traditional Establishment 
Clause analysis of Lemon. 
A VALID SECULAR PURPOSE WITH NO FACIAL "PRIMARY EFFECT" 
In determining whether a governmental statute comports with the 
Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court begins by inquiring whether the statute 
explicitly or deliberately discriminates among religious denominations. If it does, 
the case must be reviewed under strict scrutiny analysis. 14 This analysis has 
been utilized in only a limited number of Establishment Clause cases where a 
statute's benefits were to be allocated only among religious organizations and 
most often where an intentional, not merely an incidental disparate impact, was 
evident. 
In Kendrick the plaintiffs below argued that the AFLA should have been 
reviewed under strict scrutiny, but the district court properly rejected this notion 
because the statute's plan was facially neutral and intended the inclusion of not 
only religious organizations, but secular organizations as well. Consequently, the 
district court applied the three-prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman. 15 
To withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Lemon test, a statute I) must 
contain a valid secular purpose, 2) must not have the primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion, and 3)" must not foster excessive entanglement between 
government and religion. 16 Failure to meet anyone of these three elements may 
render the provision unconstitutional.17 
Judge Richey's opinion in Kendrick held that while the AFLA met the valid 
secular purpose of providing a means of combating teenage pregnancy and 
educating adolescents in sexual matters, it failed the last two elements of the" 
Lemon test.18 Plaintiffs below advanced the argument that the AFLA, when 
compared with its predecessor, Title VI of the Public Health Service Act, was a 
statute motivated wholly by religious purposes and therefore did not satisfy the 
14 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
15 657 F. Supp. at 1557. 
16 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
17 657 F. Supp. at 1557. Recently, though, in Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court 
has hinted that a regulation which fails one or more of the tests may nonetheless 
be held constitutional. See 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
18 657 F. SuPp. at 1570. 
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first prong of the test. 19 Yet the district court found, based on the AFLA's 
abundant legislative history, that the AFLA possessed a valid secular purpose.20 
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the district court found that, on 
its face and as applied, the statute had the "primary effect" of advancing 
religion,21 and thus, the AFLA impermissibly violated the Establishment Clause. 
That "primary effect" finding of facial invalidity appears to be based on only two 
narrow determinations: the fact that the legislative history of these provisions 
demonstrated that Congress clearly intended religious organizations to participate 
in these programs as both grantees and as unpaid participants22, and the factthat 
the statute contained no explicit restriction against the teaching of religion qua 
religion.23 
Congress' expressed intention to include religious organizations in the 
provision of AFLA services and counseling appears to be the primary basis for 
Judge Richey's decision. Relying heavily on the fact that the AFLA required 
applicant groups to describe how they "will, as appropriate in the provision of 
services .. .involve religious ... organizations:24 the district court concluded that "the 
statutory scheme is fraught with the possibility that religious beliefs might infuse 
instruction ... and [t)his possibility alone amounts to an impermissible advancement 
of religion."25 
As appellants argue, simply reqUlrlDg such information to be provided by 
each applicant cannot, without more,· be viewed as statutorily compelling religious 
involvement.26 The authoritative Senate Report27 states that "religious affiliation 
19 [d. at 1559. 
20 Neither the Brief for Appellees nor any of the briefs filed by amici curiae 
in support of appellees before argument at the Supreme Court raise this issue of 
the Lemon test. 
21 657 F. Supp. at 1560. 
22 [d. at 1562. 
23 [d. at 1562-63. Although the District Court took judicial notice of the 
fact that the Department of Health and Human Services' "Notice of Grant Award 
applicants to the AFLA stated that grants may not be used to "teach or promote 
religion," it nevertheless found this unpublished and unenforceable administrative 
warning inadequate to protect against the sectarian use of AFLA funds. [d .. at 
1563. 
24 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B) (1982). 
25 657 F. Supp. at 1563 (emphasis in original text). 
26 Appellant's Opening Brief and Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, Kendrick v. 
Bowen, appeal docketed, No. 87-253 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Brief for 
Appellant). 
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is not a criterion for selection as a grantee.,,28 Moreover, a number of Supreme 
Court cases make clear that absent an initial determination that a particular 
recipient is "so permeated by religion that the secular side cannot be segregated 
from the sectarian,"29 religiously-affiliated organizations may participate fully in 
governmental programs.30 Certainly, the Supreme Court has never held that 
theEstablishment Clause requires exclusion of religious organizations from 
pu blicly-supported social programs.31 
Governmental funding schemes for social service programs administered by 
religiously-affiliated colleges and hospitals have been upheld in instances where 
the aid was shown to be clearly designated for other than a specifically religious 
purpose and where it was neutrally available to all types of groups.32 Thus, 
programs authorizing non-categorical grants to. private colleges,33 state issuances 
of revenue bonds for construction of private college facilities,34 and federal 
construction grants for private colleges35 have been upheld by the Supreme Court, 
defying invalidation under the initial "primary effect" inquiry. Indeed, it can be 
said that a historical relationship exists between charitable factions of religious 
groups and government in the providing of social services. Religious organizations 
continue to participate in a variety of programs funded by state and federal 
governments including soup kitchens, drug abuse programs, orphanages, nursing 
homes, housing, job training, tutoring, school lunches, refugee resettlement, and 
foreign disaster relief.36 
The district court opinion in Kendrick suffers from its failure to discuss 
analogous Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases involving social program 
27 S. Rep. 97-161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
28 S. Rep. 97-161, 97th Con g., 1st Sess., 15-16 (1981). 
29 See, e.g., Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 759 (1976). 
30 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 199 (1899); Walz v. Tax Comm., 
397 U.S. 664 (1970); Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 
444 U.S. 646 (1980). 
31 "[T]he proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program 
which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation has 
consistently been rejected." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742 (1973). 
32 Roemer, 426 U.S. at 746. 
33 [d. at 736. 
34 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
35 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
36 McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 
405, 421. 
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schemes like the AFLA. More specifically, Judge Richey's decision may have been 
fortified by a comparison of this case to the factually similar line of 
SupremeCourt school prayer/moment-of-silence cases37 or the line of cases 
involving federal funding of questionably religious programs in public schools.38 
Here, Kendrick is distinguishable from a number of these cases as the AFLA 
was not directed solely at augmenting secular elements of otherwise sectarian 
organizations, but on its face solicits participation by "religious and charitable 
organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector" as 
well.39 The inclusion of religious organizations as participants in the AFLA, 
according to its legislative history, was aimed at the general desire to involve the 
whole targeted community in the programs.40 
The AFLA's reference to religious groups as potential grantees of the Act's 
funds should not warrant invalidation of the statute without a more definitive 
showing that the statute's provisions had, under Lemon, the primary effect of 
establishing religion.41 On this point, the district court's opinion, which applies 
an unconventional "direct and immediate" test to this issue, is clearly 
inappropriate. 
The Supreme Court in Hunt v. McNair42 articulated the standard for the 
"primary effect" prong of the Lemon test. "Aid normally may be thought to have 
a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which 
religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in 
the religious mission.43 
In Kendrick, the district court chose to apply an apparently less stringent 
test for "primary effect" than Supreme Court precedent dictates, asking whether 
the statute had a "direct and immediate effect of advancing religion."44 This 
inquiry eliminates the need to determine if the purported effect is "primary,n and 
37 Such a discussion would have included Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) 
and Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985). 
38 See. e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); and 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
(1973). Two other recent and very applicable school cases are Grand Rapids 
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
39 42 U.S.C. §300z-5(a)(21)(B) (1982). 
40 S. Rep. 97-161, 97th Con g., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1981). 
41 See 403 U.S. at 602. 
42 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
43 [d. at 743. 
44 657 F. Supp. at 1560 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783). 
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instead directs the examination to the quality of the effect, regardless of whether 
it is "primary." In an unmethodical way, the district court has reduced the 
test'sthreshold requirement of a showing of "primary effect" to a showing of 
simply any effect. 
Perhaps because it is not obvious that the AFLA's scheme, on its face, had 
the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, the district court felt more 
comfortable in applying the Nyquist test of "direct and immediate." On this point 
the district court's decision is weak inasmuch as no Supreme Court case mandates 
such a conclusion absent a more purposeful and discriminatory showing on the 
face of the statute. 
AS APPLIED, THE AFLA ESTABLISHES RELIGION 
Following a somewhat haphazard factual review of the case record, the 
district court in Kendrick held that the AFLA "creates an explicit connection 
between a state-sponsored program, a religiously identified organization, and 
either a religiously-inspired curriculum or a classroom replete with religious 
symbols"45 and that this interrelationship amounted to a "significant symbolic 
benefit to religion."46 
The touchstone of findings of "primary effect" in Establishment Clause cases 
has been that the law in effect supplies government funds for the teaching of 
religion. Where government aid amounts to a subsidy of the religious organization 
and the subsidy cannot be segregated from religious activity, the Supreme Court 
has declared the subsidy to be unconstitutional.47 The AFLA was a statute with 
a few constitutional strikes against it to begin with. Although Congress generally 
. has the authority to impose conditions in the selection of institutions recelvmg 
federal funding under its various spending programs,48 the AFLA program is 
exceptional in that it contemplates a large amount ($3 million) of direct funding 
to religious organizations. Moreover, the nature of the social service invol,ved, the 
teaching and counselling of adolescents, is thought to present particular problems 
if agency monitoring of the programs becomes necessary to ensure that funds are 
not used for religious ends.49 In particular, the Supreme Court has noted that, in 
certain contexts, a danger may inhere that teachers may abuse an apparently 
45 657 F. Supp. at 1566. 
46 [d. at 116 (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982». 
47 Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 372 (1985). 
48 See infra pp. 22-25. 
49 See infra pp. 19-22; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-20. 
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neutral scheme to promote religion.50 Finally, the Court has repeatedly expressed 
a concern that adolescents are highly impressionable and thus are likely to 
perceive factors such as instruction at locations replete with religious symbols, 
for instance, as a union between church and state.51 
The Supreme Court has previously noted, and one of the appellees in this 
case persuasively advances, that there is a special concern where religion is 
involved, albeit incidentally, in the teaching of emotionally vulnerable 
adolescents. 52 Particularly in the instant case, where it was clearly contemplated 
that AFLA programs would target pregnant adolescent women, there is an 
inherent danger that religiously-affiliated groups will take this opportunity to 
inculcate their religion to young individuals at a vulnerable time in their lives.53 
In essence, the AFLA is program whose purpose is to teach morals, an 
objective which carries with it the inherent danger that religion will be used to 
instill such morals in these young individuals. "The Act expressly calls upon 
religious organizations to convey certain religious values to minors, not to provide 
a service such as passing out breakfast to children.,,54 Indeed, it is the unique 
nature of the social services provided by the AFLA that jeopardizes the doctrine 
of separation of church and state; the pernicious combination of religious 
organizations teaching morality makes the AFLA particularly suspect. 
Appellants in this case sharply contest the district court's factual findings 
and argue that it relied selectively on a few of the appellees' assertions in 
holding that the statute "in effect" established religion.55 Certainly, the district 
court's discussion of the various groups participating in the program was 
arbitrary. By selectively focusing on a few of the more hyperbolic instances 
found during discovery involving sectarian groups, the Court's factual findings 
lack any comprehensive review of all the participating organizations. The Court 
briefly concludes that the statutory scheme of the AFLA was "fraught with the 
possibility that religious beliefs might infuse instruction and ... [that) this possibility 
50 Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (1985). 
51 Grand Rapids School Dist. V. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985). 
52 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 40 I U.S. 602, 615-20 (197 I). 
53 Brief for Appellees and Cross-Appellants at 47-49, Kendrick v. Bowen, 
appeal docketed, No. 87-253 (U.S. Jan. II, 1988) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees). 
54 "'Chastity Act' Lawsuit is Pitting Religions Against One Another," 
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1988, at 12, col. 1. 
55 Reply Brief for Appellant at 2-5, Kendrick v. Bowen, "appeal docketed, No. 
87-253 (U.S. Jan II, 1988). 
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alone amounts to an impermissible advancement of religion."56 
Pointing to factually similar Supreme Court cases where instructional 
programs involving religious groups with concededly legitimate secular purposes 
were struck down.57 the district court held that if the mere danger of inculcating 
religion. especially with adolescents. was considered to be enough in those cases. 
that the AFLA must also fail. Kendrick states. where there is a "possibility that 
religious organizations will exert pressure on 'matters sacred to conscience·... it 
renders the program invalid."58 
The Kendrick decision suggests that the Supreme Court is scrutinizing more 
closely, and may be more willing to invalidate. programs which merely present the 
danger that religion may be inculcated. Kendrick reads the Supreme Court's cases 
to say that a presumption of unconstitutionality is created by programs where 
religiously-affiliated groups are even afforded the opportunity to proselytize and 
that such schemes will be invalidated without an ample factual showing that 
religion "in effect" was ever established under it.59 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A RELIGION? 
Neither the district court nor the Justice Department, as appellee. addressed 
the question of whether the AFLA tends to establish a particular religious belief 
or practice. This article suggests that the AFLA's conspicuous stipulation that 
only groups which "do not advocate. promote or encourage abortion"60 may 
participate denotes a discrete governmental preference for certain religious 
56 Kendrick V. Bowen. 657 F. Supp at 1563. 
57 657 F. Supp. at 1563-64. See Grand Rapids School Dist. V. Ball. 105 S. Ct. 
3216 (1985); Engel v. Vitale. 370 U.S. 421 (1962); McCollum v. Board of Educ .• 333 
U.S. 203 (1948); and Felton v. Secretary of Education. 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984) 
a/I'd sub nom .• Aguilar v. Felton. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
58 657 F. Supp at 1563. See also McCollum v. Board of Educ .• 333 U.S. 203. 
227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J. concurring); Meek v. Pittenger. 421 U.S. 349. 366 
(1975); and Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball. 105 S. Ct. 3216. 3225 (1985). 
59 657 F. Supp. at 1563. 
60 42 U.S.C. § 300z-10(a) (1982). 
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denominations in violation of the Establishment Clause prohibition~61 
Perhaps the clearest precept of the first amendment's Establishment Clause is that 
one religion may not be favored over another.62 A statute which endorses a 
particular religious belief or practice that all citizens do not share offends the 
Establishment Clause.63 Yet the program benefits of the AFLA may only be 
awarded to groups which do not currently advocate abortion. Thus, appellees and 
amici curiae argue, certain denominations, specifically Catholic, are favored by the 
largess of the AFLA. As such, this provision creates the "specter of the 
preferred church."64 
Plaintiffs originally established standing in Kendrick by claiming federal 
taxpayer status pursuant to Flast v. Cohen65 clause. Under Flast, taxpayer 
standing is permitted to challenge a congressional statute's constitutionality if the 
plaintiff can prove that a "logical nexus" exists between their status as taxpayers 
and their challenge to the appropriation.66 No tangible injury need be shown. 
It is conceivable that this case would have been framed quite differently had 
it not been brought under taxpayer standing. Throughout the AFLA's history, 
only one group is reported to have been denied participation because it did not 
meet the requirements of the controversial abortion restriction. This statistic is 
perhaps attributable to the fact that the facial restriction most likely had the 
effect of discouraging any group "tainted" by its prior involvement in abortion 
counseling or referral from even applying for funding. Accordingly, none of the 
interested parties to the suit have plead that they had been injured by a denial 
of funding in order to sue on other constitutional grounds, e.g., equal protection 
or due process. For this reason, and because taxpayer standing was 
available,plaintiffs did not need to assert that the AFLA tended to establish "a 
61 Plaintiffs in the original action, B'Nai B'Rith Defamation League, 
contended that the AFLA has a tendency to benefit groups affiliated with certain 
denominations, namely Catholic ones which oppose abortion under any 
circumstances, and exclude others. Members of the Jewish faith do not regard a 
fetus as a living person, and therefore do not necessarily oppose abortion as part 
of their religious beliefs. Brief for Appellees 25, Kendrick v. Bowen, appeal 
docketed, No. 87-253 (U.S. Jan. II, 1988). 
62 "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another," Larson v. Valente, 456 
U.S. 228,244 (1982). 
63 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985). 
64 "'Chastity Act' Lawsuit is Pitting Religions One Against One Another," 
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, March 6, 1988, at 12, col. 1. 
65 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
66 Id. at 102-03. 
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religion" or' a preferred group, but only that it tended to establish religion in 
general. 
The AFLA's restriction clause is regarded as the red herring in Kendrick 
primarily because it injects the volatile issue of abortion into the case. As the 
district court stated, "The Court ... does not decide any issue related to abortion."67 
However, the statute undeniably draws a distinction between organizations which 
will and will not qualify according to a criterion which deeply divides religious 
groups. This amounts to the establishment of a religion. 
In effect, the AFLA endorses those religious organizations which embrace 
the religious tenets that premarital sex and abortion are forbidden and wrong.68 
Such a statute, which "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, 
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community,·69 
offends the Establishment Clause. 
On this point, the government argues that abortion is an issue of public 
importance, the subject of both secular and theological concern, and that the 
Establishment Clause is not violated merely because the issue "happens to coincide 
with the tenets of some or all religions."70 Although the government concedes 
that abortion is "a central concern of many religious faiths," it argues that 
abortion is equally capable of being discussed in secular terms.71 
The Justice Department maintains that the issue is not whether abortion is 
capable of being discussed in religious terms, but whether a particular participant 
in the program must be presumed to be unable to convey that subject in lawful, 
secular terms.72 Reasonable men would agree that abortion could be either a 
secular or a religious issue, depending on the context of discussion. However, the 
genuine legal issue here is whether the stipulation contained in the AFLA, 
presuming that abortion may be discussed by religiously-affiliated counselors under 
67 657 F. Supp. at 1553 n.3. 
68 See Brief of Council on Religious Freedom as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, Kendrick v. Bowen, appeal docketed, No. 87-253 
(U.S. Jan. II, 1988). 
69 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
70 Brief for Appellant at 36, Kendrick v. Bowen, appeal docketep, No. 87-253 
(U.S. Jan. 11, 1988) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 421 (1961). 
71 [d. 
72 Brief for Appellant, supra note 26 at 37-38. 
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the terms of the statute 73 in a secular manner, tends to establish a preferred 
religion. A purely pragmatic examination of the AFLA might also include asking 
whether the stated primary purpose of the statute, to address the social ills of 
teenage pregnancy and premarital sexual relations, can be fulfilled in the context 
of a program which limits discussion of abortion.14 
Implicit in the government's argument on the abortion issue is that Kendrick 
is governed by the Supreme Court cases of Maher v. Roe 75 and Harris v. 
McRae,76 which held that the states and the federal government may refuse to 
fund medically-necessary abortions in furtherance of an articulated policy of 
favoring childbirth over abortion. 
The Justice Department, relying on McRae and Harris for the proposition 
that a women's right to choose to have an abortion is not a fundamental, free-
standing right and that governmental policy preferences may permissibly govern 
the allocation of funds affecting this right, maintains that the restriction clause 
of the AFLA is permissible. 
The Justice Department may be overextending the precedential value of these 
two cases in contexts outside the conditional spending jurisprudence, as it is 
unclear whether this proposition carries any weight in an Establishment Clause 
context.77 Furthermore, even if Congress is accorded great deference in creating 
a spending scheme to address compelling social problems, if it effectually validates 
/a preferred social agenda known to be shared by some specific religions or 
factions and not others, has Congress in fact established a preferred religion?78 
The district court opinion in Kendrick states that "a society is only free 
when individuals are left free from direct or indirect pressure to abandon their 
own cherished religious beliefs for whatever set of beliefs currently holds 
government favor."79 Clearly, the language of the lower court's opinion speaks 
73 The condition of the grants are that they be "made only to projects or 
programs which do not advocate, promote or encourage' abortion." 42 U.S.C. § 
300z-1 O(a)( 1982). 
74 See infra, text accompanying notes 92-101. 
75 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
76 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
77 Harris was a First Amendment/Due Process case: McRae was a Equal 
Protection Clause case. U.S. CONST. amend. I and amend. XIV, 1. 
78 See infra text accompanying notes 102-15. 
79 657 F. Sup~ at 156~ 
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not only of the danger of establishing "a" preferred religion,80 but also alludes to 
the danger of institutionalizing the moral or secular beliefs of the current 
political majority. Not all religions, nor all people agree that premarital sex and 
abortion are wrong or sinful. To subordinate the will of the individual for the 
will of the instant majority on "matters sacred to the conscience" violates the 
core prohibition of the Establishment Clause. 
POLITICAL ENTANGLEMENT AND DIVISIVENESS 
The Kendrick Court determined that the third prong of the Lemon test, 
whether the statute fosters an excessive entanglement between church and state, 
was satisfied.81 In appraising excessive entanglement, the Supreme Court 
examines three factors: 1) the character and purpose of the institutions 
benefitted, 2) the nature of the aid, and 3) the nature of the relationship between 
the governmental and religious organization.82 The Kendrick Court found that 
because the religious organizations receiving benefits have a religious character 
and purpose, and because the risk of abuse with direct monetary grants was 
great, that the risk of institutionalization of a religious doctrine could only be 
overcome by government monitoring so continuous that it would rise to the level 
of excessive entanglement.83 
As noted above,84 the nature of the counseling and instructional programs 
under the AFLA is likely to present a danger that religious beliefs will be 
inculcated in those taking advantage of the programs. Based on a number of 
Establishment Clause cases, the Court found excessive entanglement because of 
the oversight which the program would reQuire.85 "Unlike a book, a [counselor] 
cannot be inspected once to determine the extent and intent of his or her 
personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First 
Amendment."86 The entanglement prong of the Lemon test has been the subject 
80 "When the power, prestige, financial support of government is placed 
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure on religious 
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
81 657 F. Supp. at 1567. 
82 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 615. 
83 657 F. Supp. at 1567. 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 45-59. 
85 657 F. Supp. at 1567-68. 
86 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. 
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of recent criticism, though. Justice Rehnquist has called it the "Catch-22" 
paradox of the Court's creation, citing findings such as Kendrick which state that 
the type of program necessarily requires supervision to avoid entanglement, yet 
the that supervision itself would cause the entanglement.87 Another commentator 
asserts that the entanglement prong of the Lemon test is largely responsible for 
the anomalous· results in many Establishment Clause cases.88 
In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor suggested that the entanglement 
prong be replaced by a test that asks whether the government intends to convey 
a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.89 This new test would 
require courts to make a broader factual examination of the history of a program 
such as the AFLA and would require more than a showing that a "danger of 
establishing religion" inhered in the program. If applied to the AFLA, this new 
test would affirm the district court's finding under the "effect" prong of the 
Lemon test that Congress' scheme was one under which certain religious 
affiliations would be benefited. 
The entanglement prong has also been viewed by the Court as an inquiry 
into whether the program tends to create "political divisiveness."90 Although at 
least one justice does not believe that this is an appropriate test for 
Establishment Clause purposes,91 the "political divisiveness" that the AFLA creates 
is conspicuous. The Act has the effect of "religious gerrymandering" by choosing, 
in restricting access to federal funds, to champion one side of a highly 
inflammatory and polemic issue that deeply divides religions. If the AFLA works 
to benefit certain religions and not others because of a restriction that is very 
politically divisive, religion has in effect been established. 
THE CHASTITY ACT AND CONDITIONAL SPENDING 
Although Kendrick was not brought to challenge the AFLA as a 
87 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420-21. 
88 Choper, "The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the 
Conflict," 41 U. PITT. L. Rev. 673, 681 (1980). 
89 465 U.S. 668, 691-94 (1983). 
90 See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 796; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623. 
91 Justice O'Connor has stated, "In my view, political divisiveness along 
religious lines should not be an independent cause test of constitutionality," 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 689 (concurring). She has recently added that any 
discussion of the entanglement prong should be limited to institutional 
entanglement in the nature of the governmental activity, and should not review 
the possible political divisiveness that the program creates among partisan interest 
groups. Felton, 473 U. S. at 421-30. 
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congressional coercive spending case, it raises a few profound constitutional 
concerns about such programs. The General Welfare Clause of article 192 confers 
on Congress only a power to spend; it confers no express independent power to 
regulate.93 It has long been held that government may not regulate matters 
indirectly which it cannot regulate directIy.94 
While Congress today has the broad power to choose to subsidize or 
otherwise encourage certain activities, its power to discourage or penalize other 
activities by attaching conditions or privileges is questionable. In two very recent 
cases, the Supreme Court has held that unconstitutional conditions compelling the 
surrender of independent constitutional rights are invalid.95 
In FCC v. League oj Women Voters,96 the Court invalidated a provision of 
the Public Broadcasting Act that prohibited any noncommercial educational station 
receiving public funds from endorsing candidates or editorializing. The Court held 
that under the scheme the stations would have to forfeit their first amendment 
right of freedom of expression if they wished to receive funding. The case is 
notable because of its treatment of the conditional spending restriction on free 
speech as a direct regulation. 
The 1986 case of Babbitt v. Planned Parenthood Federation,97 concerned a 
state funding program similar to the AFLA. The state of Arizona appropriated 
state funds to pay for family-planning services on the condition that such funds 
would not be made available to groups offering abortions, abortion referral or 
counseling for abortions. The state argued that the measure was permissible 
under Maher v. Roe98 as an exercise of a state's right to withhold public funds 
from abortion-related services. The Supreme Court, in summary affirmance of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held that it was improper to flatly deny 
92 "The Congress shall have the Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States." U.s. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
93 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
94 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), held that a state may not deny 
unemployment benefits to a person who refuses to work on Saturday for religious 
reasons. 
95 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) and Babbitt v. 
Planned Parenthood Fed., 107 S. Ct. 391 (1986), aJf'g Planned Parenthood of 
Central & Northern Arizona v. Arizona, 789 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986). 
96 468 U.S. at 364. 
97 107 S. Ct. at 391. 
98 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
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money to groups which could separate their abortion-related from their non-
abortion services and thereby qualify for funding under the program.99 
Both of these recent cases stand for the proposition that Congress may not 
coercively manipulate constitutionally protected rights by denying funding for 
certain programs. Although the Court's opinion in Babbitt did not address this 
point expressly, the fact that it struck down the state's plan in the face of 
Maher v. Roe weakens the precedential value of the Maher decision in this 
area.I 00 Interestingly, these two decIsions, relied upon by appellants in Kendrick 
who assert that these cases squarely stand for the proposition that federal and 
state governments may choose to champion childbirth and choose not to fund 
abortions, are in question after Babbitt. 
Professor Laurence Tribe and other authorities have stated that at the time 
it was decided, Maher seemed to ignore all of the Court's earlier cases 
establishing that the government's decision to fund a program and not another 
may be unconstitutional if its purpose is to discourage the exercise of a 
constitutionally-protected right.I 0I If indeed Maher has now been narrowed and 
a woman's right to an abortion, whether "fundamental" or not, may not 
necessarily be interfered with by the state, Kendrick should also be regarded as 
acase which confirms the notion that Congress may not regulate in areas which 
affect constitutionally-safeguarded rights of the individual. 
If, through the AFLA, Congress has not impermissibly regulated the 
constitutional right of a woman's access to groups willing to offer her the 
constitutionally-protected right choice to abortion, it has impermissibly restricted 
her first amendment guarantees by a content-based regulation of her right of 
access to information about sexual matters and abortion. 
99 It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the 
State of Arizona's assertion that funding must be denied outright to groups such 
as Planned Parenthood which applied for funds for its non-abortion related 
services, but which also provided abortion-related services. The Court found that 
it was not "impossible," as the State contended, to monitor through a review of 
accounting records, where allocated funds were directed. 789 F.2d at 1351. 
Contrast this with the Court's trend in recent Establishment Clause cases to apply 
a slapdash answer to the entanglement prong of the Lemon tests. See, e.g., Grand 
Rapids School District, 473 U.S. at 398, where the Court treated the issue in one 
sentence on the last page of its opinion and Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683-84, where the 
issue was mentioned in one paragraph. 
100 See supra note 98. 
101 Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative 
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 332-37 (1985). See 
also Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 1103, 1142-56, 1158-59 (1987). 
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CHASTITY AND RESTRAINT 
Although Kendrick was never plead as a first amendment l02 free speech 
case, the abortion restriction clause of the AFLA can be scrutinized as a form of 
censorship or restraint of free speech. The language of the AFLA states that 
"grants may be made only to projects or programs which do not advocate, 
promote or encourage abortion."103 Although this restriction primarily serves as 
a prerequisite that must be met by groups applying to participate in the AFLA, it 
may also be viewed as a prospective limitation on the activities of those groups 
which have already received funding. 
As mentioned above,104 the Supreme Court in Federal Communications 
Commission v. League of Women Voters recently held that federal funds cannot be 
denied under a restriction which has the effect of limiting free speech. 105 
Likewise, the AFLA should not be able to silence grant applicants who may 
believe that providing information about contraception and abortion, whether or 
not this is regarded as "advocating" or "promoting," may be a legitimate means of 
preventing adolescent pregnancy, the purported purpose of the Act. The Supreme 
Court has stated that "where ... a speaker desires to convey truthful information 
relevant to important social issues such as family planning and prevention of 
venereal disease ... the first amendment interest served by such speech is 
paramount."I06 When viewed in this light, the restriction clause of the AFLA 
begins to look much like impermissible prior restraint. 
The Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot discriminate in their 
subsidies in such a way that "aims at the suppression of [what are seen as] 
dangerous ideas"107 Additionally, government may not attempt to reduce in any 
way the amount of information available to it citizens.108 Fundamental to the 
first amendment is the notion that government may not forbid the suppression of 
ideas which may differ from the beliefs of whatever majority is currently in 
102 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
103 42 U.S.C. § 300z-IO(a). 
104 See supra text accompanying notes 95-96. 
105 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1985). 
106 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983). 
107 Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983). See 
also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) 
(government benefit designed to suppress a particular point of view with which 
the government disagrees is unconstitutional). 
108 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). 
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power.I 09 Yet. the AFLA contains a conspicuous viewpoint-based restriction on 
free speech in the form of a condition for federal funds. 
In addition to placing a restriction on the speech and activities of the 
organizations participating in the AFLA. it can also be said that the Act inhibits 
the privacy rights and right of access to information of individuals who seek 
counselling through one of these organizations. IIO The Supreme Court. in Carey 
v. Population Services International ill held that government may not interfere 
with this correlative right of access to information about private decisions. 
This speech restriction of the AFLA should be particularly disquieting when 
one considers the type of individual whom the AFLA is targeting. According to 
the statute. the AFLA was aimed at adolescents. some pregnant. who were more 
.likely to live in low-income communities w1th high rates of regnancy. I 12 Because 
of the economic status and youth of the individuals who would benefit from the 
AFLA. their needs would render them more vulnerable and their decisions would 
be more easily influenced 113. Additionally. they are less likely to have access. 
through other avenues, to accurate information about abortion and contraception. 
In light of these facts. free speech concerns should clearly take on heightened 
importance where teenage sexual education is concerned. I 14 
The Supreme Court may choose to embrace the argument advanced by the 
Justice Department here that because government may choose not to fund a 
woman's abortion,1l5 it may therefore permissibly choose not to fund programs 
which "advocate" or "promote" abortion. Even so. the proposition that 
government may choose not to fund a woman's abortion does not grant that 
government authority to restrict her access to information regarding that decision, 
109 Abrams v. U.S .• 250 U.S. 616. 630 (1919) O. Holmes. dissenting). 
110 See Brief of Amici Curiae (NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and 
National Abortion Rights Action League) In Support of Appellees and Cross-
Appellants. Kendrick v. Bowen, appeal docketed, No. 87-253 (U.S. Jan. II. 1988). 
111431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
112 "In approving applications for grants ... the Secretary shall give priority to 
applicants who -- 1) serve an area where there is a high incidence of adolescent 
pregnancy; 2) serve an area with a high proportion of low-income families and 
where the availability of programs of care is low ... " 42 U.S.C. § 300z-4(a) (1982). 
113 These decisions may include whether or not to carry a fetus to full term. 
114 In Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Products, 463 U.S. at 74 n.30, the Supreme 
Court said that "the right of privacy in matters affecting procreation applies to 
minors ... [and] it cannot go without notice that adolescent children apparently have 
a pressing need for information about ·contraception." 
liS Under the authority of Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
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whether that access is or is not publicly funded. In this light, the AFLA's 
provisions, to the extent that they jeopardize a woman's access to this 
information as well as the first ame·ndment freedoms of groups participating in 
the program, are clearly unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court, in assessing the constitutionality of the Adolescent 
Family Life Act, should affirm the ultimate holding of the district court in 
Kendrick. When examined under the traditional test of Lemon, the AFLA should 
be found to contain a legitimate secular purpose and should not be held to have 
the facial effect of establishing religion. However, as applied, the statute tends 
to establish a religion. 
First, because the AFLA sought to provide a social service which involves 
teaching and counseling of adolescents on "matters sacred to the conscience," the 
nature of the program itself falls into a somewhat suspect class of activity. The 
danger that religion will be inculcated in this setting is great, and the Court in 
Kendrick expressly states that the suspicious scheme of this program is a factor 
in its holding. Based on the presence of this danger, the district court, with an 
unsatisfactory review of the factual record of Kendrick, applied a less scrutinizing 
standard, finding that the AFLA had the "primary effect of establishing religion." 
However, the district court's opinion is not necessarily erroneous. 
Judge Richey's opinion most likely reflects the sentiment that the AFLA, if 
it did not intend to establish religion, provided a program which. enunciated a 
valid legislative purpose but was intended to be highly accommodating to religious 
interests. Moreover, in the imposition of an abortion-related restriction on 
participant groups, the AFLA further meddled in the religious sphere. In choosing 
to deny access to the program's funds to groups which could not guarantee that 
they would not promote abortion, the AFLA had the effect of "religious 
gerrymandering" among religious denominations, based on their particular belief on 
this divisive issue. In this way, the AFLA had the impact of benefitting only 
religious and secular organizations which shared the view that discussion of sexual 
relations and pregnancy must exclude any advocacy of abortion under any 
circumstances. 
For purposes of Establishment Clause analysis, the abortion rest/iction clause 
is relevant only to the extent that it applies to the third prong of the Lemon 
test, excessive entanglement, and that it creates severe political divisiveness 
among religions. If the AFLA were challenged on an equal protection or first 
amendment basis, this controversial restriction would provide further grounds for 
invalidation of the Act. 
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The Supreme Court's dispositio~ of Kendrick may elucidate the deficiencies 
of the Lemon test, in particular the "excessive entanglement" and "political 
divisiveness" inquiry, and will most likely refresh the Court's Establishment Clause 
analysis. 
42 
VIRGINIA ATTORNEY SANCTIONS: 
THE RIGHT STUFF, OR THE BIG CHILL? 
by 
Mark Raby 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1983, Congress radically amended Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The new rule, referred to by some as "Rule II with teeth,,,1 makes 
the signature of an attorney or pro-se litigant a certificate that the pleading is 
grounded in fact, warranted by law (or a good faith argument for its extension, 
modification, or reversal) and not interposed for an improper purpose, such as 
harassment or delay.2 
The amended Rule requires courts to impose sanctions for violations.3 These 
sanctions may include a requirement to pay attorney's fees and other expenses. 
From its inception, the new Rule II created a tremendous upsurge in attorney 
sanction litigation.4 
lCarter, The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 4 
(1985) (stating that the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 was "designed to put teeth 
into the old rule"). 
2 See Fed R. Civ. P. 11. 
3 [d. 
4 See Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions. 
100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 631 n.5 (1987). 
The new Virginia attorney sanctions rule may provide a bridge to imposition 
of sanctions under the federal rule in cases removed to federal court. In the 
fourth circuit case of Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 257 the 
court circuit court supported the denial rule II sanctions in a suit filed in state 
court and removed to federal court. The circuit court pointed out that 
availability of sanctions under such circumstances may provide an incentive to 
remove frivolous suits to federal court. 
Later, in Meadow Ltd. Partnership v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 816 F.2d 970 
(4th Cir. 1987), the circuit court quoted the lower court's statement that Rule II 
sanctions are never to be imposed in a case removed from state court "until such 
time as the states adopt counterpart rules so that their judges can give litigants 
who launch non-meritorious cases the same dose." Although the circuit court held 
that dismissal of the Rule 11 motion was error, they did so because the district 
court failed to consider sanctionable conduct that occurred after the case was 
removed to federal court. Thus, the question of whether Rule II sanctions would 
be applied in a case filed in Virginia and removed to federal court since the 
adoption of § 8.01-271.1 remains open. 
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In 1987 a joint subcommittee of the General Assembly of Virginia brought 
their own version of Federal Rule II to the Virginia Code, as part of a 
comprehensive package of tort reform.5 According to the subcommittee, it is the 
public perception "that frivolous suits are clogging the court system".6 Although 
the subcommittee received no testimony or other evidence suggesting such 
congestion, they included the provision to "improve public confidence in the 
[court] system.,,7 
While improving the public image of the judicial system is a laudable goal, 
attorney sanctions should be applied with caution. Overly enthusiastic application 
of sanctions may "chill" some legitimate advocacy. Improperly applied, the 
provision could also pit lawyer against client in a contest over liability for 
sanctions. This would erode public confidence in the lawyer-client relationship, 
and thus of the court system as a whole. 
This article begins with a discussion of possible requirements of § 8.01-271.1 
by analogy to case law and commentary under Federal Rule II. Next, the author 
examines the relationship between § 8.01-271.1 and the ethical duties of a lawyer 
to his client, noting potential conflicts that could arise through improper 
application of the Virginia rule. Finally, the author concludes that must apply 
the provision conservatively, or risk erosion of public confidence in the court 
system, contrary to the rule's stated purpose. 
DISCUSSION 
The Certification 
1. Reasonable Inquiry. Both the federal rule and § 8.01-271.1 require an 
attorney representing a party to sign each pleading, written motion, or other 
paper of the party.8 Both rules make such a signature certification that, to the 
best of the attorney's "knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable 
5 JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS 
AND THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM, REPORT TO THE VIRGINIA GEN. 
ASSEMBLY OF 1987, Senate Document No. II (1987) [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE 
REPORT]. 
6 Id. at 16. 
7 Id. 
8 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1987). 
Unlike the federal rule, the Virginia sanctions provIsion also includes oral 
motions. Id. This reflects the more informal practice of Virginia district courts, 
where much of the practice is based on oral motions. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, 
supra note 5, at 16. 
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inquiry," it is well grounded in fact and law.9 Before the adoption of § 8.01-
271.1, a lawyer's duty to ground his pleadings in the law was contained in the 
Code of Professional Responsibility.IO The provision purports to give us an 
objective standard to decide what constitutes a frivolous pleading or motion. It 
9 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1987). 
The full text of the provision reads: 
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of 
record in his individual name, and the attorney's address shall be stated 
on the first pleading filed by that attorney in the action. A party who 
is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or 
other paper and state his address. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by 
him that (i) he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to th' 
best of his knowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable 
inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and (iii) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 
cost of litigation. If a pleading, written motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the 
omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. 
An oral motion made by an attorney or party in any court of the 
Commonwealth constitutes a representation by him that (i) to the best of 
his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is 
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
(ii) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed or made in violation 
of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed the paper or made the motion, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an 
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other 
paper or the making of the motion, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
[d. 
10 Disciplinary Rule 7-102 states that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly 
advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he 
may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument 
for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Rules of the Virginia 
Supreme Court, Pt. 6, § II, DR 7-102(2) (1987). 
Section 8.01-271.1 includes the additional requirement that an attorney not 
bring a claim that with reasonable inquiry would show to be legally groundless. 
Disciplinary Rule 6-101(1) requires an attorney to "demonstrate the specific legal 
knowledge, skill, efficiency, and thoroughness in preparation employed in 
acceptable practice by lawyers undertaking similar matters ... " Rules of the 
Virginia Supreme Court, Pt. 6, § II, DR 6-101(1) (1987). This rule, operating in 
tandem with DR 7-102(2), constitutes a reasonable inquiry duty like that imposed 
by § 8.01-271.1. 
45 
leaves us, however, searching for a standard. What constitutes a reasonable 
inquiry? A reasonable inquiry of law, according to some courts and commentators 
dealing with Rule II, may operate on a sliding scale. In their view the 
requirement would vary with an attorney's expertise and access to research 
tools. I I 
Furthermore, Rule II case law suggests that counsel may have a continuing 
duty under § 8.01-271.1 to ensure that a pleading is well founded. In the Rule 11 
case of In re Continental Securities Litigation the defendant claimed that there 
was no basis for joining him in the suit. The court noted that Rule II sanctions 
could be proper "if it develops that [the defendant] was included in the complaint 
without reasonable basis, or has been kept in this case beyond the point where 
his improper joinder should have been evidence [sic].,,12 
The question of what constitutes a reasonable inquiry of fact is, perhaps, 
even more difficult. For example, to what extent is a lawyer entitled to rely on 
the factual representations of his client? Some commentators analyzing the 
federal rule suggest that a lawyer must always seek independent verification of 
his client's representations. 13 This view finds some limited support in case law.1 4 
Other writers disagree, framing the question as whether it is reasonable to rely 
solely on the client's word.1 5 These writers suggest several factors to use in 
determining whether it is reasonable to rely on the client's word, including the 
client's basis of knowledge, length of association with the lawyer, and cost of 
seeking corroboration.1 6 The latter view, which focuses on the reasonableness of 
an attorney's actions, is more efficient. It saves the client the expense of having 
II See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129 
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (noted access to LEXIS), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986). 
See also Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Rule 11 - a Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 
181, 194 (1985). 
12 No. 82-C-4712 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 1984) (WESTLAW, DCT database, 1985 WL 
3296) (emphasis added). . 
13Marcus, Reducing Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact 0/ The Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules 0/ Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 
365(1983); See also Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some 
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 
GEO. L.J. 1313, 1319 (1986) (suggesting that an attorney must make an 
investigation if it can prove or disprove the client's representations). 
14 See Coburn Optical Indus. Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 6iO F. Supp 656, 659 
(M.D.N.C. 1985) (Holding that the requirements of Federal Rule II are not 
satisfied where an attorney relies on his client's assurances that facts do or do 
not exist, when a reasonable inquiry would reveal otherwise). 
15 See Rothschild, Fenton, & Swanson, Rule 11: Stop. Think and 
Investigate, 11 LITIGATION, Winter 1985 at 13, 14. 
16 [d. at 14. 
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his own representations verified when the attorney has good reason to trust their 
veracity. 
2. Improper purpose. Section 8.01-271.1 imposes sanctions on an attorney who 
brings an action for purposes of harassment or delay.17 Since the provision is 
framed in terms of motive, it calls for the courts to inquire into the state of 
mind of the attorney when the action was instituted. Some courts considering 
Rule 11 have avoided employing such a subjective standard by inferring improper 
purpose from a violation of the objective portion of the rule. 
Thus, a court may find improper purpose if reasonable inquiry (the objective 
standard) would have disclosed that the action was not well grounded in fact and 
law. In Hudson v. Moore Business Forms. Inc. 1S the court employed this 
reasoning in imposing Rule 11 sanctions on defense counsel for groundless 
counterclaims. The Hudson court said that the lack of reasonable justification for 
the sanctioned firm's claims raised "a strong inference that the defendant's motive 
in bringing the counterclaim was to harass the plaintiff and to deter similar 
actions from being brought.,,19 
The objective standard can also guide consideration of the "good faith 
argument for extension, modification, or reversal" exception to the requirement 
that a pleading be based on existing law. Without reasonable inquiry into existing 
law (under the objective standard) one cannot make a good faith argument to 
change it. 
The sanctions provision will no doubt be attractive to lawyers, since it can 
be a powerful litigation tactic. Some lawyers may hope to persuade opposing 
counsel to nonsuit a borderline claim with the threat of a sanctions motion. 
Lawyers, however, must take care in employing the provision. A motion for 
attorney sanctions not grounded in law and fact, brought with improper motive, is 
itself subject to sanctions under § 8.01-271.1. 
Sanctions 
By increasing the range of sanctions at a judge's disposal, § 8.01-271.1 
becomes a tool for more flexible docket management. For example, suppose that a 
Motion for Judgment20, the pleading which initiates an action at law in Virginia, 
is not well grounded in fact or law. Without the sanctions provision, a judge 
sustaining a demurrer to such a pleading has only two options. The judge 
could allow amendment if the defects could be cured. If the plaintiff does not, 
17 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1987). 
18 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
19 Id. at 484. 
20 See Rules of Virginia Supreme Court 3:3 (1987). 
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or cannot, fix his pleading, the suit would be subject to dismissal. 
While this system allows one with a valid claim to overcome defects of form, 
it leaves unpunished those who, while having a valid claim, do not make a 
reasonable inquiry into fact or law before filing their initial pleading. Under the 
new provision, sanctions may be levied on those responsible: Attorney, client, or 
both. Applied correctly, this flexibility would allow more efficient and fair case 
management. For instance, a court may punish an attorney for abuses of the 
system, while allowing his client's cause to proceed. As the author will argue in 
part II(C) of this article, improper application could result in a 
battle between attorney and client over liability for sanctions, which would have 
a deleterious effect on the system as a whole. 
While the provision makes sanctions for violation mandatory,21 the type and 
severity of punishment is left to judicial discretion.22 The law allows for the 
award of expenses and attorney's fees, but does not mandate them. Indeed, 
criticism alone may prove a powerful sanction. Publication or dissemination of an 
unfavorable sanctions ruling may tarnish the public and professional reputation of 
an attorney.23 
Some courts have shown great creativity in fashioning sanctions under the 
federal rule. In Heutt;g & Schromm v. Landscape Contractors Counci/,24 the 
court awarded $5,625 in attorney's fees to the defendant union, specifying that no 
part of this penalty was to be paid by the client.25 Furthermore, the court chose 
to publish the highly critical opinion, and required that a copy be distributed to 
each lawyer in the sanctioned firm.26 
21 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1987). 
22 Id. 
23 See Schwarzer, supra note 11, at 201 ("Judges are prone to forget the 
sting of public criticism delivered from the bench. Such criticism, while 
potentially constructive, can also damage a lawyer's reputation and career ... 
There is a distinction between bad practice and lack of integrity."). 
24 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), a/I'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986). 
25 Id. at 1522. 
26 Id. at 1522-23; See also Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 
103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (requiring decision to be shown to all 
attorneys in firm); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 512, 514 (N.D. Cal. 1984) 
(requiring dissemination of decision to all Assistant United States Attorneys in 
the Northern District of California engaged in similar litigation). 
It is interesting to note that Articles by Judge Schwarzer, caution judges 
about the potentially harmful effects of such dissemination, despite his own 
frequent use of such sanctions. See Schwarzer, supra note 23. 
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Ultimately, the type of sanction imposed may turn on a judge's view of the 
purpose of sanctions. The subcommittee report speaks only in terms of 
deterrence,27 a function which is served whether the provision is applied as an 
economic or punitive measure. 
Professor Arthur Miller, reporter to the advisory committee that fashioned 
the new federal rule, supports the economic justification of such a sanctions 
provision. Although the federal rule (like the Virginia law) speaks of sanctions, 
Professor Miller asserts that it is "in reality ... more appropriately characterized 
as a cost-shifting technique" to redistribute the cost of litigation between the 
parties or their attorneys.28 Professor Miller feels that the sanctions are merely 
an economic incentive for lawyers to "stop and think" before pursuing claims.29 
Judge William W. Schwarzer of the Northern District of California views the 
federal rule as a punitive measure.30 "The rule provides for sanctions, not fee 
'shifting" writes Judge Schwarzer, "[ilt is aimed at deterring and, if necessary, 
punishing improper conduct rather than merely compensating the prevailing 
party."31 
This latter view is more likely to be adopted by Virginia courts. If viewed 
as a cost shifting tool, sanctions are likely to be an effective deterrent only to 
the extent that they outweigh the benefit of sanctionable conduct. For instance, 
some lawyers may make a motion designed to cause delay if they believe it is 
worth the monetary cost of having to pay attorney's fees. Without the stigma of 
punishment, sanctions will do little to remedy the unfavorable public impression of 
the court system as the legislature intended. 
If the sanctions are to be viewed as punitive, they should be applied with. 
extreme caution. Overzealous implementation of § 8.01-271.1 could harm the 
relationship between lawyer and client, and chill zealous representation of the 
client's claim. 
27 See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT at 16. 
28Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 34. 
For a more complete discussion of the views of Professor Miller and Judge 
Schwarzer on the purpose of Rule 1 I see Nelken, supra at n. 13. 
29 Miller & Culp, supra note 27, at 34. 
Some writers suggest that making sanctions more palatable by portraying 
them as mere cost-shifting provisions will make them more likely to occur. See 
Nelken, supra note 13 at 1323-24. 
30 See Schwarzer, supra note 11, at 185. 
31 [d. 
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Potential for Damage 
Part of the burden of enforcing the sanctions provision rests on the 
attorney. He is responsible for examining a client's claim before proceeding. The 
legislature, by deliberately including attorneys among those who can move for 
sanctions, made them partly responsible for detection and punishment of 
violations.32 Thus, the sanctions provision reinforces the attorney's role as an 
officer of the court. A stringent application of the provision may bring the 
attorney's duty to the system into conflict with his duty as an advocate. This 
section compares an attorney's duty under § 8.01-271.1 to his duty as advocate 
(largely contained in Virginia's Code of Professional Responsibility) and argues 
that both should be considered in interpreting the sanctions provision. 
1. Chilling Zealous Representation. The sanctions provision imposes a duty on 
the attorney to refrain from employing claims and defenses not grounded in fact 
and warranted by existing law.33 Furthermore, the lawyer has an ethical duty to 
evaluate his client's claim, and to inform the client if the claim has a limited 
chance of success.34 In some part these duties of a lawyer to client and court 
overlap and reinforce each other. Courts must remember, however, that today's 
frivolous claim is tomorrow's law. Courts must carefully weigh the possibility of 
squelching legitimate advocacy before applying sanctions for advancement of a 
legal argument. 
Sanctions for incorrect legal judgment are likely to fall, as they should, on 
the lawyer.35 Over-application of such sanctions may stifle legal creativity. 
From fear of economic loss and injury to reputation, many lawyers will decline to 
represent clients with novel or disfavored claims. Thus, the pressure at the 
boundary of existing law that is responsible for the development of legal doctrine 
may cease to exist. 
Yet this pressure must exist if a lawyer is to properly serve his client. 
Although driven back from the courts by potential sanctions, lawyers are urged 
forward by ethical considerations. While stringent application of § 8.01-271.1 may 
discourage some borderline factual and legal assertions; EC 7-3 encourages a 
lawyer, in his role as advocate, to "resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the 
bounds of the law."36 Courts must also be wary of applying the wisdom of 
hindsight when examining pleadings. Discovery may prove invalid a claim that 
32 See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT at 16-17. 
33 [d. 
34 See, e.g., Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, Pt. 6, § II, EC 7-5 (1987). 
35 See Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
36 Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, Pt. 6, § II, EC 7-3 (1987). 
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seemed well grounded in fact when filed. An attorney in this predicament should 
voluntarily nonsuit,37 but even that won't shield him from sanctions. The 
provision . focuses on the signing of a groundless pleading, not the continuous 
wrong of pressing an ill-founded claim. The court should examine whether at the 
time of signing38 reasonable inquiry would have shown the pleading or motion to 
be groundless (or that the lawyer continued to pursue it after discovering it was 
groundless). 
This inquiry requires particular restraint on the part of judges in the 
context of the "grounded in fact" requirement. Neither lawyers nor judges can 
determine the sufficiency of alleged facts without examining the plausibility of 
legal arguments that organize them into a claim.39 A set of facts, while 
insufficient under existing law, may be adequate when coupled with a plausible 
argument for a change in the law.40 Before courts recognized the doctrine of res 
ipse loquitur, a plaintiff had to make a direct showing of causation to recover 
from negligence. Since the adoption of the doctrine, it is only necessary to show 
that the instrumentality of the harm was in the defendant's contro1.41 
2. The Lawyer-Client Relationship. Candid, open communication between 
lawyer and client is in best interest of the lawyer, the client, and the system as 
a whole. Among the obvious benefits from a policy of candor is the reduction of 
frivolous litigation. As previously noted, a lawyer should advise his client when a 
claim stands little chance of success.42 Conversely, a client should apprise his 
lawyer of all relevant facts, even if they are unfavorable to his claim. Such 
communication should reduce the number of groundless actions filed. 
Aggressive application of sanctions can damage the lawyer-client relationship 
and stifle such candor. The sanction provision allows apportionment of sanctions 
between lawyer and client. A lawyer being sanctioned for pressing a novel, yet 
potentially successful claim could conceivably avoid sanctions by showing that he 
advised the client against proceeding. Similarly, a lawyer could likely avoid 
37 See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-380 (1984). This statute has been construed to 
confer upon a plaintiff the absolute right to one nonsuit. A first nonsuit under 
complying with this section cannot be blocked by opposing counsel nor the court. 
Nash v. Jewell, 227 Va. 230, 237 (1984). 
38 Or at the time of making of an oral motion, as provided for in Va. Code 
Ann. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1987). 
39 See Note. Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards jor Rule 11 
Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 637 (1987). 
40 [d. 
41 [d. 
42 See EC 7-5 supra note 34. 
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sanctions for a pleading not grounded in fact if it can be shown that he was 
misled by the client. 
The preservation of client confidences and secrets is an important part of 
the attorney-client relationship. However. Virginia's Code of Professional 
Responsibility provides that a lawyer may reveal confidences or secrets necessary 
to defend himself against an accusation of wrongful conduct.43 Thus. an attorney 
may expose client secrets or his own work product to shift sanctions· to the 
client. 
An erosion of trust will occur as clients learn about the potential use of 
their secrets by attorneys to avoid sanctions. As a result. they are likely to be 
less candid with their lawyer. Also. lawyers wishing to limit their liability for 
ill-founded legal arguments are likely to become more conservative in evaluating a . 
client's claims. This may also limit client candor. encouraging clients to withhold 
information detrimental to their case. The tension created by over-applied 
sanctions. would affect the relationship of attorney and client to the court as 
well. Courts could unwittingly discourage disfavored claims as lawyers seek to 
avoid sanctions. Sanctions may be deliberately employed by some courts to clear 
overloaded dockets. since the court may impose sanctions sua sponte. Courts 
abusing sanctions as a case management tool may effectively remove from client 
and attorney the decision of whether to test a claim in court. and vest it in the 
judge. 
CONCLUSION· 
The stated goal of the legislature in providing for attorney sanctions is to 
improve public confidence in the court system.44 · With that goal in mind. courts 
should be wary of over-applying such sanctions. To do so would create tension 
between a lawyer's duty to zealously represent his client and his responsibility as 
an officer of the court. Many lawyers. fearing censure and economic loss. would 
not resolve that conflict in favor of the client. This may further erode public 
confidence in the attorney-client .relationship. and thus of the court system as a 
whole. 
To promote confidence in the system. courts must use sanctions as a scalpel. 
not as a bulldozer. Courts must use discretion in finding violations of the 
provision and. fashioning punishment. A broad reading of the sanctions provision 
would create a disincentive to some legitimate advocacy and limit access to the 
courts. Therefore. Courts must cut away frivolous claims and defenses carefully. 
43 Rules of the Virgin.ia Supreme Court. Pt. 6. § II. DR 4-101(C)(4) (1987). 
44 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT. supra note 7. at 16. 
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or risk chilling the zealous representation that drives the adversary system. and 
ensures continued development of the law. 
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